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Abstract: This contribution re-analyses some standpoints of the notion of
paribhāṣā through the looking glass of later Advaita Vedānta. The article is
limited to single text, namely Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra’s (17th–XVIIIth century)
Vedānta Paribhāṣā. This text does not present the peculiarities of earlier
paribhāṣās, hence the title paribhāṣā somehow assumes a sense closer to
“Elucidation” or “Manual”. Nevertheless, placing Vedānta Paribhāṣā within a
wider historical and philosophical milieu, an attempt is made to investigate the
reasons why Dharmarāja willingly chooses such an evocative title, which is
solidly rooted on a technical background. Further, the paper proposes some
hypothesis and case-studies concerning Dharmarāja’s understanding of
paribhāṣā.
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1 Introduction
In the previous chapters several facets of the concept of paribhāṣā have been
discussed. I would like to re-analyze some points under the magnifying glass of
later Advaita Vedānta. I shall limit my analysis to a single text, namely the
Vedānta Paribhāṣā, attempting to insert it within the cultural and textual milieu
in which it was written. The Vedānta Paribhāṣā does not present the same
peculiarities as those of earlier paribhāṣās, hence the title paribhāṣā somehow
comes closer to assuming the guise of an “Elucidation” or “Manual” (see
Freschi). Nevertheless, we should try to investigate why the author wittingly
chooses such an evocative title, which has a solid technical background.
There are several questions which require an answer: is the term paribhāṣā
used rigidly to indicate an interpretative rule, a meta-rule or limitative rule, or
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could its purport be extended to other contexts? How do the generally accepted
definitions and functions of paribhāṣā apply to the Vedānta Paribhāṣā? On what
kind of structural and conceptual foundations is it based? How does the title
paribhāṣā apply to it? Does the Vedānta Paribhāṣā present a single level of
interpretation of the term paribhāṣā or does it represent a confluence of several
meanings of that term?
In the following pages I shall introduce and contextualize the Vedānta
Paribhāṣā, so as to suggest some hypotheses concerning the use of the term
paribhāṣā as a title often applied to particular kinds of primers. I suspect that
the Vedānta Paribhāṣā presents and develops many of the meanings of the term
paribhāṣā that come from other disciplines, adapting them to the historical and
philosophical specificity of early modern Advaita Vedānta.
In order to provide some answers, I shall in primis place the Vedānta
Paribhāṣā’s author – Dharmarāja Adhvarin – in a precise geographical area and
in a specific historical period. This is useful in order to present the cultural
landscape of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā on a broader scale. In fact, the Vedānta
Paribhāṣā should be situated within a definite textual milieu, not only in the
Advaita tradition, but more broadly within the textual panorama of the numerous
analogous primers written when the school of New Logic was spreading through-
out India. In order to fully understand the real extent of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā’s
influence, I believe it is essential to indicate briefly the texts to which it is
indebted as well as those with which it is in contrast. Only once the framework
in which the Vedānta Paribhāṣā developed has been determined, will I be able to
fully penetrate and communicate its paribhāṣā-nature (paribhāṣātva), with the
merging of the multiple semantic nuances of the term developed by other dis-
ciplines across the centuries. Then, in order to show concretely the multiple level
of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā’s paribhāṣātva, I shall present some case studies
selected from throughout the text. I am convinced that what we see in the
Vedānta Paribhāṣā is a re-semantization of a (primarily grammatical) technical
term which, due to the lack (until later in time) of a formal definition of the word
paribhāṣā and to its multiple functions as well, conforms to the specific context
and discipline in which it is newly displayed, thus assuming therein a definite
shape.
2 Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra
In the Kevalādvaita Vedānta milieu the paribhāṣā label was applied only to the
Vedānta Paribhāṣā (hereafter VP), a very late text written by Dharmarāja
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Adhvarin o Adhvarīndra (hereafter DR), who lived between the second half of
the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries.
In the VP, DR first salutes his master’s master Nṛsiṃha (Nṛsiṃhāśrama,
sixteenth century)1 as well as his guru Veṅkaṭanātha,2 both of whom lived in
Tamilnāḍu.3 In the verses that follow DR informs readers of his textual produc-
tion: he is the author of the Tarkacūḍamaṇi, a gloss on Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya’s
Tattvacintāmaṇi4 and also of the Nyāyaratna, a commentary on Śaśadhāra’s
Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa (twelfth century).5 Both these specifications highlight DR’s
great familiarity with Navya Nyāya. He is also the author of the Padayojanikā
commentary on Padmapāda’s Pañcapādikā (ninth century), and with this remark
he hints at his own philosophical stance within Advaita Vedānta.6 The last verse
1 For some information on Nṛsiṃhāśrama, see Sastri-Sastri (1959: 47–48). Nṛsiṃhāśrama wrote
several works on Advaita philosophy: the Advaitadīpikā, the Tattvaviveka, the
Tattvavivekadīpana, the Bhedadikkāra, etc. Among his most influential pupils are Nārāyaṇa
Āśrama, Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Veṅkaṭanātha, DR’s teacher.
2 From the scarce information we have, it seems that at least two Advaitins called Veṅkaṭanātha
lived during the same period. The Veṅkaṭanātha who was DR’s teacher remains almost unknown.
As for the other Veṅkaṭanātha, we know that he wrote a sub-commentary on the
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, namely the Brahmānandagiri, and one on the Bhagavadgītā. In the Gītā’s
gloss he criticizes Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Guḍhārthadīpikā. We can probably consider this
Veṅkaṭanātha nearly Madhusūdana’s older contemporary (Sitamahalakshmi 2003: 276–280).
3 VP (2000: 1): yadantevāsipañcāsyair nirastā bhedavāraṇāḥ | taṃ praṇaumi nṛsiṃhākhyaṃ
yatīndraṃ paramaṃ gurum || 2 || śrīmadveṅkaṭanāthākhyān velāṅguḍinivāsinaḥ | jagadgurūn
ahaṃ vande sarvatantrapravarttakān || 3 || “I bow down to him, called Nṛsiṃha, lord of
wandering ascetics, the great master, whose pupils like lions have conquered the elephants
of difference (2). I revere the master of the universe, called the glorious Veṅkaṭanātha, who
resides at Velāṅguḍi, the promulgator of all disciplines (3)”.
4 VP (2000: 1): yena cintāmaṇau ṭīkā daśaṭīkāvibhañjinī | tarkacūḍmaṇir nāma vidvanmanoramā
|| 4 || “He who has compiled a gloss on the Tattvacintāmaṇi, named the Tarkacūḍamaṇi, which
annihilates ten [earlier] glosses, fascinating for the learned”. Notwithstanding these words, the
Tarkacūḍāmaṇi is more precisely a commentary on Rucidatta Miśra’s Prakāśa (mid-fifteenth
century), a commentary on the Tattvacintāmaṇi.
5 The Śaśadhāra’s Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa is an important precursor of the Tattvacintāmaṇi.
Śaśadhāra acts as a connecting author between Udayana (eleventh century), the supposed
initiator of Navya Nyāya, and Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (thirteenth–fourteenth century), Navya
Nyāya organizer (Matilal 1977: 102–103).
6 Padmapāda is the silent initiator of the “theory of reflection” (pratibimbavāda). After
Prakāśātman Yati’s Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa (eleventh–twelfth century), the school was named
vivaraṇaprasthāna. The VP says (Mādhavānanda 1997: 3; Sastri 1971: 2): ṭīkā śaśadharasyāpi
bālavyutpattidāyinī | padayojanayā pañcapādikā vyākṛtā tathā || 5 || “moreover [he has written] a
gloss on Śaśadhara, which warrants the understanding of beginners, and has also commented
upon the Pañcapādikā with the Padayojanā.” This verse is absent from the VP (2000), VP/AD
(1984) and VP (1983).
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displays VP’s subsidiary purpose (avantāra prayojana): to introduce and instruct
in Advaita doctrine those who are ignorant or slow-witted (manda).7 All these
elements are useful in sketching some important features connected with VP’s
peculiar paribhāṣātva.
3 Towards the paribhāṣā-framework of the VP
3.1 Other paribhāṣā-treatises
During the philosophical history of pre-modern India there are some texts
written by the Advaitins’ opponents which are stylistically connected with the
VP and seem to debate with it and pursue similar objectives. All of them are
somehow related to a peculiar re-semantization of the word paribhāṣā (or bhāṣā)
which occurred during those centuries. We can attempt to trace a relative
chronology of these works.
It is likely that DR was socially close to the author of the Mīmāṃsā
Paribhāṣā (hereafter MP), Kṛṣṇa Yajvan (or Dīkṣita), as both were members of
the Yajvan family based in Tamil Nadu. But we know very little about Kṛṣṇa
Yajvan8: some scholars believe he lived between 1700 and 17609 and therefore
situate the Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā slightly later than the VP. The Mīmāṃsā
Paribhāṣā represents the only explicit paribhāṣā-text within Pūrva Mīmāṃsā,
exactly like the VP within Advaita Vedānta.10
Geographically close to the VP is Śivāgrayogin’s Śaivaparibhāṣā (hereafter
ŚP), which could also be considered a possible source or textual model for the
VP (as for the Yatīndramatadīpikā as well),11 but while DR makes extensive use
7 VP (2000: 15): tena bodhāya mandānāṃ vedāntārthāvalambinī | dharmarājādhvarīndreṇa
paribhāṣā vitanyate || 5(6) || “For the comprehension of the slow-witted [students] that
Dharmarājādhvarīndra has composed the ‘Elucidation’ grounded on the meaning of Vedānta
[ =Upaniṣads]”.
8 Mādhavānanda 1987: xii; Bhattacharya 1998: 16.
9 Śāstrī 1992: 187–188.
10 Regarding Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, more than the Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā, I believe Laugākṣi
Bhāskara’s Arthasaṃgraha (sixteenth–seventeenth century) and, even more thoroughly
Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa (mid-seventeenth century) to be closer to the VP in terms
of language, style, purposes and readers.
11 In the preface of the Madras edition and translation of the ŚP, Balasubramanian writes (1982:
iii): “The Śaiva-paribhāṣā, which is a valuable manual on Śaiva Siddhānta, is comparable to
Dharmarāja’s Vedānta-paribhāṣā of the Advaita school and Śrīnivāsa’s Yatīndramata–dīpikā of
the Viśiṣṭādvaita school.” (Soni 1989: 53–54 n. 102).
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of the New Logic techniques, Śivāgrayogin does not. Śivāgrayogin (sixteenth
century) wrote the ŚP as a synthetic compendium of all doctrines and concepts
of Śaiva Siddhānta.12 It is divided into five sections (pariccheda): the first is
dedicated to epistemology13 while the other four touch on ontological and
cosmological matters.
Viśiṣṭādvaita’s reply to the VP is Śrīnivāsa Dāsa’s Yatīndramatadīpikā (here-
after YMD), which is called by the author himself the Śārīrakaparibhāṣā. Śrīnivāsa
Dāsa’s father, Svāmī Puṣkariṇī Govindācārya, lived in Tirupati and was a pupil of
Mahācārya. According to Ādidevānanda, Mahācārya was a friend of Appaya
Dīkṣita (1520–1592).14 Mahācārya lived in the second half of the sixteenth century
and consequently, Śrīnivāsa Dāsa can be situated between the late seventeenth
and the beginning of the eighteenth century, thus a contemporary of DR, who
lived in the same land. The YMD should be considered to be slightly later than the
VP, because Śrīnivāsa is aware of the VP and quotes it in fact in a pūrvapakṣa.15
The YMD is divided into nine “descents” (avatāra): the first three deal with
Viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology, while the other six are dedicated to ontology.
I have mentioned that DR also demonstrated a remarkable knowledge of
Nyāya. At this point, a work worth mentioning is Keśava Miśra’s (between the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries) Tarkabhāṣā. A striking feature is that several
manuscripts of Keśava Miśra’s work report in the beginning as well as in the
colophons: Tarkaparibhāṣā.16 Therefore, bearing in mind this successful title and
also the period when Keśava Miśra lived, it seems possible to recognize a certain
kind of influence of the Tarkabhāṣā-model on the title and choices of DR.17
12 Soni 1989: 39.
13 In the ŚP the terminology, the problems analyzed and the definitions proposed are closer to
Prācīna Nyāya than to Navya Nyāya. For example, the structure follows the scheme of 16
categories (padārtha) of the early Nyāya and on several other issues – pseudo-probans
(hetvābhāsa) etc. – utilizes that same lexicon. Moreover, it can easily be seen that ŚP’s style
is close to Tarkabhāṣā’s.
14 Ādidevānanda 1949: xxviii–xxx.
15 In a pūrvapakṣa the YMD (Ādidevānanda 1949: xxix n. 3, 19–20) seems to quote two passages
from the VP (2000: 61–62, 102–103): the first is placed at the opening of the chapter on direct
perception (YMD 1949: 19) while the second concerns the inclusion of certain kinds of verbal
knowledge within the scope of the knowledge born out of direct perception (YMD 1949: 19–20).
16 Bhandarkar 1979: xix–xvi; Kunjunni-Raja 1974: 116–117.
17 Like the ŚP, Keśava Miśra’s Tarkabhāṣā, too, was written in a period of transition from the
old to the new Nyāya. For example, it preserves the sixteen categories of the old Nyaya. This
text has at least two namesakes: a predecessor from the Buddhist milieu, namely Mokṣākara
Gupta’s Tarkabhāṣā (or the Bauddhatarkabhāṣā, between 1050–1202, Kajiyama 1988: 1) and a
successor among the Jainas, namely Yaśovijaya Gaṇi’s Tarkabhāṣā (or the Jainatarkabhāṣā,
seventeenth century).
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During a decidedly Navya Nyāya period, Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya
wrote the Bhāṣāpariccheda/Kārikāvalī. This text describes synthetically the seven
categories (padārtha) of Navya Nyāya and is accompanied by the
Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī (hereafter NSM), a considerably more extensive self-
commentary.18 Viśvanātha lived in the first half of the seventeenth century
(1630)19 and was quite probably an older contemporary of DR. The complex
Bhāṣāpariccheda-Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī soon became one of the more studied
introductory textbooks on Navya Nyāya. It could therefore be assumed that DR
knew it or might have been at least specifically acquainted with that type of
textual production if not with the NSM itself. In fact, although not so much so as
to identify a clear indebtedness, the VP often seems to reply to some critics of
Advaita included in the NSM.20
It is obvious that the VP is much more closely related to the above-mentioned
texts than to the earlier śrauta or vaiyākaraṇa paribhāṣās’ formulations. In fact,
the VP is temporally very distant from those formalizations, and its purpose is
basically pedagogical and descriptive. However, I shall suggest some points for
reflection and discuss them accordingly.
3.2 Earlier Advaita textual-models of the VP
It should be pointed out that in 1942, S.N. Dasgupta claimed that the VP was just a
simple manual of Vivaraṇa inspiration, greatly indebted to Rāmādvaya’s Vedānta
Kaumudī (fourteenth century).21 Apart from Rāmādvaya’s text, I personally think
that DR was somehow ideally influenced by the concept underlying another
Advaita text: Prakāśātman Yati’s Śārīrakanyāyasaṃgraha. Adopting the Vivaraṇa
perspective, in the Śārīrakanyāyasaṃgraha Prakāśātman synthetically explains the
entire Brahmasūtra (hereafter BS), dividing it into sections and subject-matters
18 In the second opening stanza Viśvanātha states that he wrote the NSM more analytically
than the Bhāṣāpariccheda, overwhelmed by compassion for Rājīva, a slow-witted pupil (NSM
1988: 7). In addition, it must be pointed out that according to some scholars the
Bhāṣāpariccheda/Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī was not written by Viśvanātha but by Kṛṣṇadāsa
Sārvabhauma (mid sixteenth century). See Bhattacharya (1941: 241–244) and Ganeri (2011: 76,
79–81, 85). This would reverse the indebtedness: the VP would be indebted to the
Bhāṣāpariccheda/Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī.
19 Matilal 1977: 110.
20 K. Potter (1988: 92) maintains that the VP is very similar to the Tarkasaṃgraha (TrS). On the
contrary, I believe that the distance between the TrS and the VP is significant; hence I would
suggest considering the NSM or the Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā as the Naiyāyika counterparts of the VP.
21 Dasgupta 1997: iii. For some additional information on the alleged indebtedness of the VP to
the Vedānta Kaumudī, see Pellegrini 2016a.
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(adhikaraṇa). Even though the structure of the VP is quite different from that of the
Śārīrakanyāyasaṃgraha, nonetheless the basic intent of both texts appears similar.
In fact, the effort made to collect BS’s teachings and arrange them in a simpler and
more organized manner – obviously according to the Vivaraṇa point of view –
nearly recalls the opening declaration of late paribhāṣā-texts.22 In addition to
Prakāśātman’s Śārīrakanyāyasaṃgraha, we have another text that could also be
possible connection between an earlier generation of Advaita proto-paribhāṣās and
their later textual instances. This is the Vaiyāsikyanyāyamālā, a work attributed
alternatively to Bhāratī Tīrtha, to Mādhavācārya or to Vidyāraṇya (all belonging to
the fourteenth century). The text is a Vivaraṇa-oriented metrical compendium
focusing entirely on the interpretative rules (nyāya) presented in the BS and the
BSBh, strictly following their internal subdivisions. The Vaiyāsikyanyāyamālā was
preceded by a twin compendium dealing with the nyāyas in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā,
composed by Mādhavācārya, namely the Jaiminīyanyāyamālā. The text, closely
adherent to Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra, was glossed by Mādhavācārya himself, with
the Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara. However, later on I will briefly return to nyāyas or
laukikanyāyas as interpretative rules, analogies or maxims based on situations and
examples taken from daily life (see Chierichetti, Candotti-Pontillo and Freschi, this
volume).
To return to our principal subject, from the last opening verse of the VP we
become aware of its intent: to teach Advaita Vedānta to those who are slow-
witted or never had any connection with Advaita. Although this remark seems
negligible, it conceals a pivotal historical as well as philosophical point.
4 Historical and philosophical context
4.1 Pre-modern philosophical India
Before entering into this subject matter, I shall focus briefly on DR’s historical-
philosophical period.23
22 Mutatis mutandis, the purpose of this text somehow reminds me of Maṇḍana Miśra’s
Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā and Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyasūcinibandha. In addition, let me mention
that, as rightly pointed out by Parimal Patil (2013: 95–98), the manualistic tendency most likely
began within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, from Vācaspati on, through Jayantabhaṭṭa,
Bhāsarvajña, and Udayana’s “ground breaking” treatises, becoming then, in the pre-modern
period, a must for several authors.
23 For a more in-depth description, see Bronkhorst-Diaconescu-Kulkarni 2013, Ganeri 2011 and
Pellegrini 2015: 279–282.
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The Dvaita Vedānta school is of paramount importance for the philosophical
development of the period included between the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. Madhvācārya (1238–1317) systematizes it and focuses his attention
primarily on a contemporary critic of Advaita.24 Following Madhva, the Dvaita
school includes two other great philosophers, namely Jaya Tīrtha25 and his
principal pupil Vyāsa Tīrtha.26 The significant development of the vaiṣṇava-
Vedānta is due to the fact that they were the first to adopt the style and
methodology of the new-born navya logic.
It is a fact that between the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the
fourteenth century, in the Mithilā region a new extremely rigorous philosophical
style, based on the merging together of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, was standardized.
This tendency, named Navya Nyāya (“New Logic”), developed an ultra-technical
meta-language, which in the course of two centuries became the common idiom
not only for philosophical treatises but also for grammatical, poetical and legal
ones. Although this stylistic transformation is already traceable in Udayana
(eleventh century), the standardization became evident with Gaṅgeśa
Upādhyāya’s (1325) Tattvacintāmaṇi.27 In order to provide common grounds for
discussion, the adoption of this new linguistic technology soon became the
necessary requirement for all debaters at least until the eighteenth century.
From a recent article, it emerges that in its earlier phase of formation – from
Gaṅgeśa to Pakṣadhara (alias Jayadeva Miśra, late fifteenth century) – Navya
Nyāya was jealously kept within Mithilā’s borders, where the local paṇḍitas
prevented any manuscripts from leaving the city.28 Nevertheless, it later spread
throughout India, following perhaps two main channels: the school founded at
Navadvīpa by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (fifteenth century) and the Hindū kingdom
of Vijayanagara. Vyāsa Tīrtha was the royal preceptor of the Tuḷuva dynasty
(1505–1570). During that period he wrote his magnum opus, the Nyāyāmṛta, in a
very sophisticated navya style, signalling an already advanced degree of assim-
ilation of that style by the Dvaita Vedānta school.29
During a slightly later period, its real shining star rose in the Advaita firma-
ment – Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, probably a much older contemporary of DR.
24 Sharma 1981: 77–79.
25 For Jaya Tīrtha’s date, works and philosophical positions, see B.N.K. Sharma (1981: 245).
26 For Vyāsa Tīrtha or Vyāsa Rāya, see Sharma (1981: 286) and Pellegrini (2015: 280–281).
27 Matilal 1977: 105.
28 Bronkhorst-Diaconescu-Kulkarni 2013: 73–75.
29 It is not clear how Vyāsa Tīrtha became proficient in Navya Nyāya, at that time unknown in
South-India. According to Bronkhorst-Diaconescu-Kulkarni (2013: 78–79, see also Sharma 1981:
291–296) Vyāsa Tīrtha might have been taught by Pakṣadhara Miśra, the teacher of Rucidatta
Miśra, commented upon by DR.
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Meanwhile, Appaya’s Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha (a kind of totally Advaita philosophi-
cal doxography) inaugurated a new season of harmony within Advaita Vedānta: an
internal tendency to overcome old differences and barriers. This kind of synthesis is
visible mainly in the continuous effort to find some points of contact between
Advaita’s two most important rival positions: the vivaraṇaprasthāna and the
bhāmatīprasthāna. Even while remaining faithful to their views, authors of this
period looked at other schools with a less deconstructive attitude, seeking to
harmonize previous doctrines with new developments based on the adoption of
the navya style adapted to Advaita tenets. All these elements favored fresh herme-
neutical interpretations, opening new philosophical developments and clearing the
way for what we can reasonably call Navya Vedānta.
DR’s VP is a typical textual example, gathering within itself all the inspira-
tions of such a lively cultural period because it is written at the apex of the use
of navya style in other śāstras.
Hence, going back to the final opening stanza of the VP, its readers are a
specific category of Vedānta beginners (manda) who have already acquired a
significant background in disciplines like Navya Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā in primis:
these are mandas of their own time.30 The stanza implicitly announces that
whoever should study and understand the VP would develop an enviable
introductory insight into the whole Advaita darśana, which might allow him to
easily catch any hints and references to the earlier textual heritage.31 It should
be borne in mind that even today, the VP is studied in the traditional
brāhmaṇical cursus studiorum to introduce pupils already advanced in other
disciplines to Advaita epistemology. This is due to the peculiar structure and
language of the VP, remarkably precise and capable of endowing the pupils with
all those tools needed to read more advanced texts. This might be one of the
reasons for placing the VP as a type of paribhāṣā text within such a late context.
30 In this case the word manda corresponds to the term bāla “child, kid, little boy”, utilized in
other pre-modern texts. Reading it with Candrajasiṃha’s Padakṛtya to the TrS (2007: 2): bāleti
atrā ’dhītavyākaraṇakāvyakośā ’nadhītanyāyaśāstro bālaḥ “bāla: here, child is someone who
has already studied grammar, poetry, lexicons, but has not studied the discipline of logic”.
There are also the words of the initial and final maṅgalacaraṇa of Varadarāja’s
Laghusiddhāntakaumudī (sixteenth–seventeenth century, hereafter LSK 2001: 1), respectively
pāṇinīyapraveśāya “for introducing to Pāṇini’s [grammatical] school” and (LSK 2001: 480)
śāstrāntare praviṣṭānāṃ bālānāṃ copakārikā | kṛtā varadarājena laghusiddhāntakaumudī ||
“Varadarāja has composed the ‘Lunar ray of the shortened doctrine’, which is beneficial for
the beginners already introduced to other disciplines.”
31 See the first lines of Vyāḍi’s paribhāṣā text: atra hi jñātaparibhāṣaḥ svayaṃ śāstraṃ
pratipādayituṃ samartho bhavati | sa tāvat sukhaṃ jñātaparibhāṣo bhavati (Wujastyk vol. 1
1993: 1) “Because he who has got to know the paribhāṣās becomes capable of teaching the
discipline himself. Indeed, he gets to know the paribhāṣās easily.” (Wujastyk vol. 2 1993: 1).
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4.2 The VP within Advaita Vedānta
Now, that the VP has been placed within a wider historical perspective, it should
also be situated specifically within the Advaita tradition.
Śaṃkara’s commentary on the Brahmasūtra (hereafter BS and BSBh) was
glossed several times. Out of these, three principal theories crystallized across the
centuries: the “appearance theory” (ābhāsavāda) of Sureśvara (eighth century), the
school of the “limitation theory” (avacchedavāda) initiated by Vācaspati Miśra’s
Bhāmatī (ninth century) and the school of the “reflection theory” (pratibimbavāda)
derived from Prakāśātman Yati’s Vivaraṇa (eleventh–twelfth century). Roughly,
following the twelfth century, Sureśvara’s ābhāsavāda completely merged into
the pratibimbavāda, limiting the Advaitins’ internal contrast to two schools: the
vivaraṇaprasthāna and the bhāmatīprasthāna.32
By the time of DR, internal divisions had become attenuated and had moved
towards harmonization. Notwithstanding this tendency, the substantial differences
remained unaltered. Although DR incarnates the synthetic spirit of the epoch, he
definitely is a vivaraṇa author, even if he does not refrain from expressing his own
convictions.
Hereafter I propose two tables.33 The first highlights a few differences
between the vivaraṇaprasthāna and the bhāmatīprasthāna:
vivaraṇaprasthāna bhāmatīprasthāna
The reflection on brahman (brahmavicāra) is
due to the listening-injunction
(śravaṇavidhi).
The reflection on brahman is due to the study-
injunction (adhyayanavidhi).
The execution of the act enjoined by the Veda
is done to reach knowledge (vidyā).
The execution of the act enjoined by the Veda
is done to reach desire of knowledge (vividiṣā).
Mind is not a sensorial faculty. Mind is the sixth sensorial faculty.
(continued )
32 Pellegrini 2015: 298.
33 See the introduction to the edition and Hindī translation of the VP (1984: 37–38) by
Gajānana Śāstrī Musalagāṃkara as well as the scheme proposed by Bina Gupta (1995: 102–103).
34 The reference concerns the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (2.4.5, 2.5.6): ātmā vā re draṣṭavyaḥ
śrotavyo mantavyo nidhidhyāsitavyaḥ. For the Vivaraṇa school this is a restrictive injunction
(niyamavidhi).
35 The reference is to the Vedic passage: svādhyāyo ’dhyetavyaḥ (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.5.7.2
and Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 2.15).
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In the process consisting of listening
(śravaṇa), reflection (manana) and
meditation (nididhyāsana), listening is the
primary object of the injunction (vidheya),
while reflection and meditation are
subsidiary (aṅga).
In the process consisting of listening,
reflection and meditation, listening is not the
primary object of the injunction but, with
reflection, is subsidiary to meditation.
The individual self is the reflection
(pratibimba) of consciousness (caitanya).
The individual self is consciousness limited by
the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇācacchinna).
Pure consciousness (śuddhacaitanya) is the
locus of ignorance (ajñānāśrayatā).
The individual self is the locus of ignorance.
Ignorance is one. Ignorance is multiple.
The content of the last mental modification
(caramavṛttiviṣaya) is unconditioned
brahman.
The content of the last mental modification is
conditioned (upahita) brahman.
The purpose (prayojana) of the study-injunction
is to understand single syllables and words
(akṣaragrahaṇa) which compose it.
The purpose (prayojana) of the study-
injunction is to understand the entire meaning
(arthajñāna) of the sentence.
The objects derived out of gross elements
(bhautika) are produced through the
process of “quintuplication”
(pañcīkaraṇa).
The objects derived out of gross elements are
produced through the process of “triplication”
(trivṛtkaraṇa).
Similarity (sādṛśya) is not considered among
the causes of the superimposition
(adhyāsa).
Similarity is considered among the causes of
the superimposition.
Verbal testimony (śabda) bestows immediate
knowledge (aparokṣa).
Verbal testimony bestows mediate knowledge
(parokṣa).
Oneiric manifestations (svāpnaprapañca) are
modifications (pariṇāma) of ignorance.
Oneiric manifestations are modifications of the
internal organ.
36 For a brief survey on the well-known doctrine of the pañcīkaraṇa see the VP (2000: 382–395),
the VS (Sadānanda 2004: 6–7) and Śaṃkara’s BSBh ad 2.4.22.
37 The triplication process (trivṛtkaraṇa) is analogous to the pañcīkaraṇa and literarily concerns
the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.3.3. The unique difference between these two processes lies in the
exclusion of ether (ākāśa) and air (vāyu) in the trivṛtkaraṇa. See the VP (2000: 382–395), the
BSBh ad 2.4.30, the VS (Sadānanda : –) and the Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.1.1.
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vivaraṇaprasthāna dharmarājamata
Valid knowledge is a cognition whose content
has not been previously cognized and not
subsequently sublated (abādhita).
Valid knowledge (pramā) is a cognition whose
content has not been previously cognized
(anadhigata).
Recollection (smṛti) in not valid knowledge. Recollection is valid knowledge.
Individual self is consciousness reflected on
ignorance (ajñānapratibimbitacaitanya).
Individual self is consciousness limited by the
internal organ
(antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanya).
The internal organ has two functions/
modalities: buddhi and manas.
The internal organ has four functions/
modalities: buddhi ahaṃkāra, manas and
citta.
Similarity (sādṛśya) is not considered among
the causes of superimposition (adhyāsa).
Similarity is considered among the causes of
superimposition.
The existence and persistence of illusory
superimpositions is an effect of radical
ignorance (mūlājñāna).
The existence and persistence of illusory
superimpositions is an effect of derivative/
relative ignorance (tūlājñāna).
In the superimposition of the red colour of the
china rose on the crystal, that red is illusory
(prātibhāsika) and undeterminable
(anirvacanīya).
In the superimposition of the red colour of
the china rose on the crystal, that red is
empirically real (satya).
The knowledge of invariable concomitance
(vyāptijñāna) is not a cause (kāraṇa/hetu) of
the inferential knowledge (anumiti).
The knowledge of invariable concomitance is
a cause of the inferential knowledge.
The knowledge of the speaker’s intention
(tātparyajñāna) is not counted among the
causes of verbal knowledge.
The knowledge of the speaker’s intention is
one among the causes of verbal knowledge.
Cognition of absence (abhāvajñāna) does not
have the nature of direct perception
(pratyakṣatā).
Cognition of absence has the nature of direct
perception.
38 On this issue DR follows Vācaspati. See the VP (2000: 62, 114).
39 Again DR, even though he also accepts the position of vivaraṇa, follows the
bhāmatīprasthāna (VP 2000: 150–152).
40 The avacchedavāda subdivides ignorance into two categories: the primordial radical ignor-
ance (mūlājñāna) related to brahman itself, and the derivate or relative ignorance (tūlājñāna)
connected to each cognitive error and to any effects of radical ignorance. The word tūla
indicates the hull and the fruit of the cotton plant, which conveys the idea of subordination
of tūlājñāna to mūlājñāna.
41 The reference is to the well-known example of the transparent (svaccha) crystal gem
(sphaṭikamaṇi) placed in front of a red china rose (japākusuma). Due to this proximity the
qualities of one – namely the redness (lauhitya) of the flower – are wrongly superimposed
(adhyasta) on the other, the transparency of the crystal.
608 Gianni Pellegrini
5 What is the nature of VP’s paribhāṣātva?
Analyzing pre-modern Advaita philosophical production and specifically,
Madhusūdana’s works, some recurrences can be noted. For example, wherever
Madhusūdana quotes sūtras from the MS or the BS, he often closes them with iti
nyāyāt, iti nyāyasiddhaḥ or similar expressions.42 Conversely, in many chapters
of the Gūḍhārthadīpikā (hereafter GAD) gloss on the Bhagavadgītā (hereafter
BG), Madhusūdana himself discusses problems related to the Yogasūtra and the
(so-called) Vyāsabhāṣya extensively, quoting from them profusely. On that
occasion, while reproducing verbatim several aphorisms he never uses the
word nyāya or its derivatives.43
Another interesting specificity or better, tendency (but not an invariable
rule!44), is that those sūtras quoted with an iti nyāyaḥ closure often present the
typical argumentative and nominalized śāstric construction: the grammatical
subject in the genitive and the property attributed to it usually expressed by an
abstract term in the ablative of cause (hetupañcamī) and sometimes in the
instrumental case (hetutṛtīyā). This kind of synthetic expression has a system-
atizing function typical of late nyāyas and paribhāṣās. These considerations
are supported by Staal, according to whom the problem concerns the bhāṣya-
style with its peculiar argumentative expression, which substitutes earlier
meta-linguistic formulations with nominalized sentences expressed through
abstract words in the ablative case (–tvāt/–tāyāḥ).45 This is also witnessed by
the use and purport of a few of Pāṇini’s aphorisms (A 1.2.53–57, which are
nevertheless of uncertain attribution).46 Staal remarks:
42 See specifically Madhusūdana’s GAD ad BG 3.33–35 (2005: 198, 201), 4.5–6 (2005: 215–219),
4.11 (2005: 223), 4.18–19 (2005: 229–231), 4.27 (2005: 241), 4.33 (2005: 252), 4.37 (2005: 255), etc.
Even so, the entire 3rd, 4th and 6th chapters of the GAD ad BG present several instances of
these uses. See also the ŚP (1982: 314).
43 In those contexts, Madhusūdana simply uses expressions like iti sūtram, sūtritam, sūtrayati,
saṃkṣepasūtraṃ … iti, sūtrayāmāsa, etc., or ity āha bhagavān patañjaliḥ, tathā ca bhagavān
patañjaliḥ. Among the many examples are: GAD ad BG 4.27–29 and GAD ad BG 5.22.
44 Because there are also several references to BS’s aphorisms quoted with the closure iti sūtrāt
or other similar ones. One example is GAD ad BG 4.37.
45 Staal 1975 and 1995: 79–80.
46 Staal (1975: 337) affirms that these syntactical constructions are very frequent in bhāṣya
literature after Patañjali. He refers to Paranjape’s book published in Paris “Le Vārtika de
Kātyāyana. Une étude du style, du vocabolaire et des postulates philosophiques” (1922: 55, which
I was unable to consult, see References in Candotti-Pontillo, this volume). In addition, Staal (1975:
337) also quotes an article by Thieme (1931) “Grammatik und Sprache, ein Problem der altindische
Sprachwissenschaft”, Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik, n. 8 (pp. 23–32) which analyzes the
same phenomenon in Prātiśākhyas (specifically the Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya 1.1–5).
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Since all quoted forms function as nouns, quotations can easily be replaced by nominalized
forms which are nouns… The replacement of quotations by nominalization is a distinguishing
mark of later scholarly Sanskrit (BSBh 1.1.2). Thus, the metalinguistic features of the earlier
phases of Indian culture are finally incorporated in the nominalized expressions which
characterize Indian thought in its later developments. These expressions constitute a rich
language which is to some extent artificial and may even be described as partly formalized.47
These statements recall Prakāśātman’s Śārīrakanyāyasaṃgraha mentioned
above, which I have considered to be the hypothetical antecedent of the VP.
5.1 Connecting the VP with earlier paribhāṣās
At this point it should be repeated that the structure and expressive models of
the VP are, however, quite distant from Śrautasūtras and grammatical texts.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to identify a subtle connecting-thread. I believe
in fact that there is a two-way relationship: on one hand, between Śrautasūtra,
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and vyākaraṇa, while on the other, between vyākaraṇa, Pūrva
Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Furthermore, as pointed out by Pelissero (see supra), an
interpretative rule has various uses and applications, from the general to the
selective and restricted. In order to put the VP in a wider textual perspective, the
considerations presented thus far should now be applied to the VP.
In the VP we find discussions which may throw some light on entire sections
of Advaita philosophy. A similar intent is evident even in the Vedāntasāra
(hereafter VS), the Siddhāntabindu and several other Advaita textbooks meant
for the sake of students, which effectively re-use earlier Advaita doctrines in
conformity with the peculiar trend of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Non-dualists of that period wrote their treatises by cataloguing variants and
tendencies and attempted new explanations within the limits of their philoso-
phical positions.48 Nonetheless, the only text within Advaita Vedānta called
paribhāṣā is DR’s. But what are the striking features of its character of being a
paribhāṣā (paribhāṣātva)? It is significant that even today every traditional
Vedānta student must study the VP.49 This proves that the VP is of transversal
47 Staal 1975: 337–338.
48 See Minkowski 2011: 212. For example, Appaya Dīkṣita writes a fourfold commentary on the
BS, collecting different points of view: dualism, qualified non-dualism, Śaivasiddhānta and
non-dualism. Although faithful to non-dualism, Madhusūdana too sees brahman in Kṛṣṇa’s
marvelous qualities.
49 Today the study of Sadānanda’s Vedāntasāra is compulsory for brahmanical students. The
VS is a systematization similar to the VP, more general and less technical, which highlights
however some recurrent issues treated by Advaita texts, but never strictly epistemological ones.
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importance not only within the perspective of the Advaitin proponent
(uttarapakṣin) but also within that of the opponents’ schools (pūrvapakṣin).
We have seen how concealed within the word paribhāṣā is a technical
semantic field and a meaning closely related to “definitions” of technical
terms and/or “definitions” expressed in technical terms. The Advaitins’ oral
tradition glosses the word paribhāṣā directly simplifying the reading of
Jinendrabuddhi’s Nyāsa (KV ad A 2.1.1: parito vyāpṛtāṃ bhāṣāṃ paribhāṣāṃ
pracakṣate): parito bhāṣate yā, sā paribhāṣā “What speaks all-around is a
paribhāṣā.”50 There is as well a third option, already quoted, according to
which a paribhāṣā “creates a restriction where there is no restriction” (aniyame
niyamakāriṇī).51
These derivations (nirvacana) generate slightly different orientations. If we
look at the first case ( = parito bhāṣā), it is similar to Patañjali’s statement
(M ad A 1.1.49: kaścid ekadeśasthaḥ sarvaśāstram abhijvalayati yathā pradīpaḥ
sarvaṃ veśmābhijvalayati, see § Editor’s overview),52 which illustrates the
revealing and indicative function of a paribhāṣā. In fact, within the VP a
paribhāṣā is sometimes used as a clue to recall some longer discussions
developed in other texts, which – in the VP – are abbreviated so that the
beginners can understand them. The second case, closer to the notion of
pariṣkāra,53 shows a relationship with definition-devices (lakṣaṇa) profusely
displayed across the VP as a refined definition (pariṣkṛtalakṣaṇa).54 The third
option presupposes a need for organization and clarity. Accordingly, the word
paribhāṣā could be intended as “systematization” or “settlement” (vyavasthā).
In this case its purport seems to me closer to the interpretative role represented
by nyāyas or laukikanyāyas. These are maxims and analogies typical of the
Indian cultural milieu, which suggest certain solutions through the observa-
tion of empirical-daily life. Even so, the line of demarcation between these
elements is extremely feeble.
50 See KV, Jayāditya-Vāmana 1985 vol. 1: 71. We could also simplify as: parito bhāṣā iti
paribhāṣā “an all-round statement is a paribhāṣā”. Moreover, playing with the prefix (upa-
sarga), oral tradition interprets the word as: pariṣkṛtā bhāṣā, vacanam iti paribhāṣā, pariṣkāra
ity arthaḥ “[it is said] paribhāṣā a refined expression, a [perfected] statement”.
51 Jhalakīkar 1978: 480.
52 Since it is roughly identical to M ad A 2.1.1 but more synthetic, I only quote the passage of M
ad A 1.1.49. See Candotti-Pontillo, this volume.
53 See also Chakravarti 1980: 27.
54 See Staal 1961: 122–124.
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First of all, there is a systematizing meta-rule (considered also a nyāya),
deriving from Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the Nyāyasūtra (1.1.3),55 which crosses
transversally all śāstras, i. e. lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyāṃ hi vastusiddhiḥ “Through the
definition and the means of knowledge there is indeed the establishment of an
entity”. Several discussions within the VP are clarifications of certain Advaita
positions, usually developed out of a definition. In fact, following the rule quoted
above, the VP is concerned primarily with definitions (lakṣaṇa), their application
(samanvaya) and the verification of their validity (lakṣaṇaparīkṣā).
I agree substantially with Fritz Staal’s (1975) hypothesis concerning meta-
linguistic formulations of the bhāṣya style. More than this, along with definitions
tout court (which I see as peculiar paribhāṣās or formulations leading to
paribhāṣās) there are all-around meta-rules that assist us in interpreting earlier
textual passages. I have therefore identified three reasons for re-semantizing the
word paribhāṣā and calling paribhāṣās texts as late as the VP:
(1) the VP is an “anthological” handbook with the aim of introducing Advaita
to students already well-trained in other disciplines. This kind of system-
atizing attempt provides several answers and elucidations to questions
raised across the centuries.
(2) The VP’s quid pluris consists in its adoption and adaptation of navya style
to the epistemological tenets of later Advaita Vedānta.
(3) The VP incarnates a precise teaching and hermeneutical iter pervasive in
the Advaita tradition of the pre-modern period and already present in
Madhusūdana’s works.
I have formulated this hypothesis after examining several texts of pre-modern
Advaita. For example, both Madhusūdana and DR, despite some differences, treat
and develop analogous issues.56
The VP finely collects and connects what was scattered! DR attempts to
bring together several doctrines previously spread out over an enormous textual
heritage, and to systematize them according to a markedly epistemological taste.
In fact, prior to the VP we do not have any well-structured manual on Advaita
epistemology. In this sense the entire VP is on one hand a general settlement
(vyavasthā) and on the other, a specification or, better, a restrictive rule
(niyama). Also specifically present within the VP is the meaning of the word
55 Pellegrini 2011: 442.
56 More than others, Madhusūdana’s Siddhāntabindu and Vedāntakalpalatikā happen to be
very similar to the VP in terms of style, language, doctrines and target, even though the VP’s
intent is explicitly pedagogical. See Pellegrini 2015 (297).
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paribhāṣā as lakṣaṇa and nyāya, rendering the VP a general meta-text useful as
a hermeneutical key for the entire Advaita śāstra.
Karl Potter (1988) analyzes the VP attempting to understand its innovations
and utility. He finds them in the VP’s “systematic reconstruction” of typical
Advaita doctrines: DR’s primer is a well-ordered and structured exposition.
Potter adds a few remarks about why DR’s exposition is organized specifically
in terms of definitions (he counts 84) chained together, derived from key-
technical “primitive terms”. He states:
What makes Dharmarāja’s definitions unusual is that they are interconnected with each
other so that all of them can be generated from a small base of primitive notions.57
In the VP, Potter identifies five characteristics of philosophical exposition, mainly
connected with the philosophy of science: internal coherence, sufficient clarity
and precision, adherence to the proposed aim – I add as well adherence to
historical period and place – accuracy and internal economy.58 Potter’s analysis
corresponds quite closely to those criteria of systematization I identify in the VP:
(1) the need to organize opinions scattered throughout Advaita texts; (2) a transla-
tion into Navya Nyāya language of Advaita epistemological tenets and their
re-elaboration consistent with the historical and philosophical moment.
These criteria of systematization move on various hermeneutical levels and
can be seen as basic characteristics of the complex nature of a paribhāṣā and/or
of a system of paribhāṣās. For this reason, paribhāṣās, at least as intended in the
VP, are synthetic formulas and penetrating interpretative tools useful in re-
reading, clarifying and reworking problematic passages, as well as agile meta-
linguistic tricks capable of moving beyond their specific textual position in order
57 Potter 1988: 92–93.
58 Potter 1988: 95. Basing his analysis on Nelson Goodman (quoted in Potter as Goodman,
Nelson (1951). The Structure of Appearance. Cambridge-Mass.: Harvard University Press), Potter
(1988: 94–96) identifies the conception of a philosophical system as a “translation manual or
scheme the input into which is a set of ordinary language statements and the output from which
consists of translations of some of these together with clarification of the others” (1988: 94).
This translation, far from being the rendering of one language in another, indicated a transla-
tion of certain concepts from a natural language to a formal, more precise and technical one.
Potter himself further clarifies: “Yet the point of the translation is not, of course, to reproduce
the deficiencies … inherent in the sentences to be translated. The translations in the manual
must be in a ‘clarified’ version of the language, one in which both the syntax and the semantics
of the translation sentences are carefully controlled so as the best to achieve satisfaction of the
criteria mentioned. Goodman argues cogently that what this conception of the philosopher’s
task suggests is the « construction of a system of definitions ».” (1988: 96).
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to disambiguate, regulate, generalize and systematize a situation wherever the
śāstra requires it (see Conclusions).
It could be maintained that Madhusūdana’s introductory works constitute
an initial attempt at systematizing Advaita. Nevertheless, he is more careful of
defending Advaita and of disputing the positions of adversaries: Madhusūdana
replies rather than presenting. Wherever he presents something, his exposition
is not systematized through preparatory steps, taking into account readers’
needs. On the contrary, DR adheres to the requirements of Advaitin-beginners.
Therefore, apart from his personal positions, there are definitions and system-
atization useful in the whole śāstra, certainly close to vivaraṇaprasthāna but
also careful of the harmonizing period within Advaita.
6 Paribhāṣās in the VP: Some “case studies”
The VP is divided into eight “sections” (pariccheda). Following a brief introduc-
tion, the first of six epistemological paricchedas begins, each dedicated to one of
the six means of knowledge accepted by Advaita Vedānta59 in accordance with
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā60: direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), compar-
ison (upamāna), authoritative testimony (āgama), presumption (arthāpatti) and
non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). The seventh section, namely the
viṣayapariccheda, is dedicated to Advaita ontology, while the last one – the
prayojanapariccheda – deals with liberation. The order of presentation of the
issues is the same as in the ŚP and the YMD.
Up until the present the VP has been studied rather extensively. In
addition to Arthur Venis’s translation (1882–1885), Mādhavānanda’s (April
1942)61 and Suryanarayana Sastri’s (May 1942),62 despite minor difficulties,
59 In its early period Advaita Vedānta is reluctant to deal with epistemology tout court. However,
pramāṇas are used in order to better comprehend the nature of both, ātman and the entities
different from ātman (Mayeda 1968–1969: 221–223). It is not clear how many and which means of
knowledge were accepted by Śaṃkara. However, we can count three of them: pratyakṣa, anumāna
and śabda (Mayeda 1968–1969: –). Prakāśātman habitually refers to four pramāṇas:
pratyakṣa, anumāna, arthāpatti and śabda (Dasgupta 1991: 105–106), even though we also find
references to anupalabdhi. Madhusūdana and then DR clearly indicate six pramāṇas.
60 In oral teaching there is a well-known maxim traditionally attributed to Citsukha vyavahāre
tu bhāṭṭanayaḥ. In the Advaita system whatever concerns empirical existence – including
epistemological issues – is treated according to the Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s view of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.
61 See Madhavananda 1997.
62 See Sastri 1971.
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are quite useful. Furthermore, three other texts analyze three different sec-
tions: Bina Gupta (1995) works on the pratyakṣapariccheda, Fernand Brunner
(1987)63 on the anumānapariccheda and Purushottama Bilimoria (2008) on
the āgamapariccheda. Two monographs follow in toto the argumentative
structure of the VP: Datta (1997) very closely and Satprakashananda (2001)
more generally. A great deal of information is scattered throughout second-
ary sources, and we find several editions and translations into various
Indian vernacular languages. Nonetheless, apart from Potter’s article
(1988), to date no other scholar has investigated why DR calls his work
paribhāṣā.
Mention should be made of a contemporary Sanskrit text: Saccidānandendra
Sarasvatī’s Viśuddhavedāntaparibhāṣā.64 This booklet is strictly based on
Śaṃkara’s commentaries on the prasthānatrayī and is aimed at instructing
students of classical Advaita in the technical terms and interpretative tools
used by Śaṃkara. According to Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī, the main interpre-
tative principle (nyāya) of the entire Advaita tradition is adhyāropāpavādābhyāṃ
niṣprapañcaṃ prapañcyate “what is free from distinctions becomes differen-
tiated through superimposition and [subsequent] negation”.65 This pan-Advaita
maxim lies on the doctrine of superimposition (adhyāsa), which represents the
very axiological foundation of Advaita.66
In the following section I shall select and discuss some insightful “case
studies” which are helpful in investigating why the VP can be called
paribhāṣā.
63 Brunner 1987: 92–119.
64 Sarasvatī 1969.
65 See the BGBh (ad 13.13) with the gloss of Ānandagiri, and the Brahmasiddhi (hereafter BSi,
Miśra 1937: 26), where this nyāya is attributed to Sundara Paṇḍya, a predecessor of Śaṃkara.
66 For some considerations on paribhāṣās, see also Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s introduction to
the text (1969: 9–10). Therein he writes that a meta-rule is a clue, a sign, a verbal convention,
which, once understood, although placed in a certain position in the text becomes useful to
comprehending the entire meaning of that text. In Vedānta, as in other disciplines, there
are several technical as well as illustrative terms, through which a secure understanding of
the treatise is achieved: viditam evaitad vācakamahodayānāṃ yat sarvam api
śāstraṃ svasvocitapāribhāṣikapadavākyanyāyādisaṃketaviśeṣānanurudhaiva svasvābhidheyaṃ
vastu pratipādayituṃ pravartata iti | paribhāṣā nāma paṭhitaikadeśasthaḥ san
svabuddhijananadvārā sarvaśāstrārthajñānopakārakaḥ padādisaṃketaḥ | vedāntaśāstre
’pītaraśāstreṣv iva pāribhāṣikapadādīni tatra tatra cakāsanti yair vijñātarair eva śāstrārthabodho
nirvicikirṣaṃ jāyeta nānyatheti jijñāsubhir avaśyaṃ tadvijñānaṃ saṃpādayitavyam |.
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6.1 Pratyakṣapariccheda
The chapter in VP dedicated to direct perception (pratyakṣapariccheda) is one of
the more detailed, where the Navya Nyāya style is massively present. Let us
examine some instances of “hypothetical” paribhāṣās which appear there.
For example, immediately after the definition of valid cognition (pramā) and
its examination (parīkṣā), DR continues his logical iter listing the instruments
(karaṇa) which allow pramā to be achieved. Before entering into the technicalities,
I shall recall however some Advaita doctrinal presuppositions.
Referring to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (3.14.1: sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma
“Everything is indeed brahman”) Advaitins claim that whatever exists is brah-
man, pure consciousness (śuddhacaitanya). According to the Taittirīya Upaniṣad
(2.1.1) brahman is truth (satya), knowledge (jñāna) and infinitude (ananta). The
Advaitins’ final aim is the direct realization (sākṣātkāra) of this absolute princi-
ple. While in the absolute realm there is only one supreme reality
(pāramārthikasattā), by contrast the empirical world (vyāvahārika) is subject to
multiple limiting conditions. These conditions are represented by the epistemo-
logical triad, namely the knowable object (prameya), the knowing subject
(pramātṛ) and the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). The individual self is the
knowing subject (pramātṛ) in every state of consciousness67 during which,
through certain means of knowledge, he experiences objects and accordingly
develops cognitions (jñāna/dhī/buddhi), which can be valid (pramīti/pramā) or
erroneous (apramā).68 If everything is brahman (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.14.1) the
elements of the epistemological triads must also be such. How then does the
infinite supreme self (paramātman) become imprisoned in the status of pramātṛ?
It should be pointed out that every cognition arises out of a rigorous process
during which a knowing subject cognizes an entity through a particular cogni-
tive mode. The instrument for attaining the valid knowledge (pramā) of an object
is called pramāṇa (pramākaraṇaṃ pramāṇam).69 The VP also suggests a defini-
tion of pramā: pramātvam anadhigatābādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvam “Being a
67 Of course the typical cognitive situation described here represents more likely the individual
self (jīva) during the awakening condition (jāgṛtāvasthā), when he is technically defined viśva.
68 It should be noted that in the VP there is a complete correspondence between the defini-
tions of pramātṛ and jīva, respectively antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanyaṃ pramātṛcaitanyam “con-
sciousness of the knowing subject is the consciousness limited by the internal organ” (VP 2000:
62) and jīvo nāmāntaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanyam “the individual self is the consciousness
limited by the internal organ” (VP 2000: 114).
69 VP 2000: 22.
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valid knowledge is to be a knowledge whose content is an object not previously
cognized and not [subsequently] sublated”.70 The following passage is then
inserted:
pratyakṣapramāyāḥ karaṇaṃ pratyakṣapramāṇam | pratyakṣapramā
cātra caitanyam eva “yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma” iti śruteḥ |
‘aparokṣād’ ity asya aparokṣam ity arthaḥ |
The instrument for a perceptual valid knowledge is the means of knowl-
edge [consisting] in direct perception. Here [ = in Advaita Vedānta] valid
knowledge is consciousness alone, as [stated] by the śruti: “What is
direct and immediate is brahman” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.4.1). The
purport of [the Vedic ablative] aparokṣāt of this [passage] is [the neuter
nominative] aparokṣam.71
Here DR quotes the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (3.4.1): only brahman is always
immediately present and directly perceivable. As a matter of fact, vedāntic
speculation constantly feels to adhere to śruti’s statements, attempting to estab-
lish them logically. According to this point of view, the light of self-luminous
(svaprakāśa) brahman manifests on the entire universe. This light penetrates
every cognitive operation, which is the expression of pure consciousness (cai-
tanya) reflected on a transparent (svaccha) psychic surface characterized by
certain functions and modifications (vṛtti).
We distinguish between two kinds of knowledge: the pure and perfect one,
which is the absolute itself (svarūpajñāna), and the empirical one, which is
mediated by the cognitive act and manifested by mental modifications
(vṛttijñāna).72 This statement prompts an objection (pūrvapakṣa): if beginningless
70 VP 2000: 22–23; Potter 1988: 106. Within this definition, the term anadhigata (“not cognized
[previously]”) rules out any content of the recollection (smṛtivyāvṛtta). The word abādhita (“not
[subsequently] sublated”) avoids the exceeding extension (avyāpti) of the definition into erro-
neous cognition (bhramajñāna), which is sublatable. In this first definition, recollection (smṛti) is
excluded from pramā context because of its mediate nature. In fact, recollection is
saṃskāramātrajanyaṃ jñānam “a cognition born out of the residual impressions alone” (TrS
2007: 61). These impressions are gathered in the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) as a consequence
of a previous direct experience (pūrvānubhava) and therefore do not share the same character of
novelty which valid knowledge must have. See also Datta 1997 (18–21) and Pellegrini (2016a). The
second definition might express the personal view of the author of the VP.
71 Gupta 1995: 137–140. In the part 6 of this article the bold is used to highlight the paribhāṣās.
72 Pellegrini 2009: 73–74. I translate the word vṛtti as “mental modification” or “modification
of the internal organ” according to the definition of the VP (2000: 63). See also the VP (2000:
48–49) which quotes Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.5.3 to explain how vṛtti ( =dhī) is a property
of the internal organ. See also indriyajanyaṃ jñānaṃ cāntaḥkaraṇaṛttiḥ (VP 2000: 415).
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consciousness is the only direct knowledge, how can we speak of means for
generating it?
nanu caitanyam anādi tat kathaṃ cakṣurādes tatkaraṇatvena pramāṇatvam
iti | ucyate – caitanyasyānāditve ’pi tadabhivyañjakāntaḥkaraṇavṛttir
indriyasaṃnikarṣādinā jāyata iti vṛttiviśiṣṭaṃ caitanyam ādimad ity ucyate
jñānāvacchedakatvāc ca vṛttau jñānatvopacāraḥ | tad uktaṃ vivaraṇe
‘antaḥkaraṇavṛttau jñānatvopacārād’ iti |
[Objection:] But if consciousness is without origin, then how is it possible
to affirm that sight and other faculties are valid means of knowledge
because they are instruments for [generating] it [ = caitanya as pramā]?
[Reply:] It should be replied that although consciousness is without origin,
the modification of the internal organ revealing it arises out of the sense
contact. For this reason, it is said that consciousness qualified by the
mental modification has an origin, because it is capable of limiting
[pure] consciousness. Thus, an implied use of [the word] knowledge
is made as far as mental modification is concerned. This is said in
Vivaraṇa73: “… since there is an implied use of the word knowledge in
[connection with] the modification of the internal organ.”74
The entire passage can be considered a settlement in order to suggest a pre-
liminary reply to a recurrent doubt. The structure implied here goes beyond the
simple passage because it also involves the pūrvapakṣa and the lapidary for-
mulation of the argumentative expression: a nominalized causal sentence with
an abstract term in the ablative (jñānāvacchedakatvāt vṛttau jñānatvopacāraḥ).
Real knowledge is only caitanya, brahman itself; hence the literal meaning
of pramā can only be brahman. Nonetheless, since the modification of the
internal organ (antaḥkaraṇavṛtti) has the capacity of delimiting and determining
(avacchedaka) the domain of knowledge, the capacity of being called “knowl-
edge” is transmitted to it by secondary implication (upacāra).
Let us return to the principal question: if everything is pure, undivided
consciousness, then also the cognitive triad – pramāṇa, prameya and pramātṛ –
should be undivided and consequently, nothing can be perceived. This would
render inexplicable the process of direct perception, which is grounded on differ-
ence (bheda). Hence, something limiting the indivisibility of caitanya must be
postulated.
73 The passage is found with a minor difference in the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa (hereafter PP/PPV,
Padmapādācārya 1992: 132): antaḥkaraṇapariṇāme jñānatvopacārāt.
74 VP 2000: 46–49 and Gupta 1995: 140–146.
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The Advaitins’ reply begins with the following considerations: knowledge as
vṛtti is by its very nature extremely changeable, since it is shaped in accordance
with cognized objects (vastutantra).75 Supreme consciousness, although unlimited
and undivided, in the cognitive process reflects itself on various surface-modes,
thus happening to appear limited (avacchinna) by multiple limitations, determi-
nations and qualifications (avacchedaka).76 In the VP this triad is expressed as
follows: pramātṛ becomes antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanya “consciousness limited
by the internal organ”, pramāṇa becomes antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinnacaitanya
“consciousness limited by the modification of the internal organ”, while viṣaya
(or prameya) is viṣayāvacchinnacaitanya “consciousness limited by the object”.77
The empirical cognition born out of the vṛtti (vṛttijñāna) is a kind of knowl-
edge and as such, shares the luminous nature of the consciousness itself.
However, in order to fulfil its manifesting function in the empirical realm, it
needs the mediation of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa).78 The antaḥkaraṇa is
an adventitious condition or limiting superimposition (upādhi) which – illusorily
– renders caitanya conditioned (upahita) or limited (avacchinna). For example,
the ether (ākāśa) contained in a jar X is not different from the ether contained in
a jar Y, because both are pervasive and undivided. Therefore, a limiting condi-
tion (upādhi) represented by these two jars has as a result that an unlimited
entity like ether appears limited (upādheya) and consequently, multiple, diver-
sified and endowed with parts: the upādheya appears divided and confined due
to the diversification of upādhis.
In order to show a more accurate perceptual process, DR introduces a causal
constituent (prayojaka/tantra) different from the contact of the senses with their
75 See BSBh 2.1.2, 2.1.11 and also BGBh 2.16.
76 A limiting agent or determiner (avacchedaka) delimits the function or the field of an entity,
rendering it limited or determined (avacchinna), namely different from another entity. There
are three kinds of avacchedaka: (1) viśeṣaṇa, the qualifier or determinant; (2) upādhi, the
limiting superimposition or adventitious condition and (3) upalakṣaṇa, the indicator. The VP
(2000: 115–116) explains further: viśeṣaṇaṃ ca kāryyānvayivyāvartakam | upādhiś ca
kāryānanvayī vyāvartako vartamānaś ca “While the determinant differentiates and is con-
nected with the effect; the adventitious condition is not connected with the effect but
differentiates and is present”.
77 VP 2000: 61–62. See also Potter 1988: 107
78 Concerning the nature of antaḥkaraṇa, it is not simple to deduce a general theory from
Śaṃkara’s writings. However, we already find the four functions of antaḥkaraṇa (BSBh 2.3.6) as
well as their nomenclature, namely manas, buddhi, vijñāna or ahaṃkāra and citta (BSBh 2.3.32,
2.4.6). See corresponding passages in the VP (2000: 97–98). DR refutes also mind sensorial
nature (indriyatva): see the VP (2000: 55–57), Mayeda (1968–1969: 225–228), Bilimoria (1980b:
36–37), Datta (1997: 40–61) and Gupta (1995: 154–156).
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objects79 maintained by Naiyāyikas. DR defines perception as not-difference
(abheda) of the three kinds of conditioned caitanya.80 To be more precise, the
process described by the VP has two distinct cognitive phases: determination of
the capacity of being perceived ( = perceptuality) of the cognition itself
(jñānagatapratyakṣatva) and determination of the capacity of being perceived of
the object (viṣayagatapratyakṣatva).81 Of these, the causal constituent (prayojaka)
of the perceptuality of the cognition (jñānagatapratyakṣatva) is the not-difference
(abheda) of three modes of consciousness.82 The modification of the internal
organ goes out through sensory canals, joins the object and pervades it, taking
its form (viṣayādyākārapariṇāma). The modification of the internal organ then
eliminates the veil of ignorance which covered (āvaraṇabhaṃga) the object.83 In
this process, the internal organ cannot be distinguished from its modification. Yet,
upon exiting the vṛtti, “consciousness limited by the mental modification”
(vṛttyavacchinnacaitanya) and “consciousness limited by the internal organ”
(antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanya) are already unified. Once these two join together
79 Naiyāyikas’ theory of perception is summarized by the definition of the TrS (2007: 78):
indriyārthasaṃnikarṣajanyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam “Direct perception is the knowledge gener-
ated by the contact of senses with [their] objects.”
80 VP (2000: 101): na hīndriyajanyatvaṃ pratyakṣatve tantraṃ dūṣitatvāt | kintu
yogyavartamānaviṣyakatve sati pramāṇacaitanyasya viṣayacaitanyābhinnatvam ity uktam |.
81 Bilimoria 1980b: 35–36.
82 According to Advaita Vedānta cognition, as mental modification –
antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinnacaitanya – as well as its content (viṣaya) both have a perceptual
character. During this process, the first perception is produced once the object is grasped and
when there is such a statement as “This is a jar”, so the cognition itself is perceived. At this point,
the content of this cognition – the jar – is also perceived. The core of the discussion reveals an
attack on the Nyāya theory of perception. Naiyāyikas think that the first perception of an object
“This is a jar” (ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ) is vyavasāya and the following cognition is “apperception”
(anuvyavasāya), whose content is the knowledge of the object: “I know the jar” (ghaṭam ahaṃ
jānāmi). Advaitins disagree with this position. The pervasive consciousness simultaneously
abides in the object, in the antaḥkaraṇa and in the vṛtti. It grasps everything at first. Actually,
within caitanya there is no differentiation (bheda) or part (avayava), but it seems threefold when
upādhis are superimposed on it. When the non-difference (abheda) between pramāṇacaitanya
and viṣayacaitanya takes place, we have direct perception of the cognition (jñānapratyakṣa): we
know not only the object but also to know that object (jñāto ghaṭaḥ, ghaṭajñānavān ahaṃ).
83 This is a reference to the function of the vṛtti. According to the theory of the “unique
individual self” (ekajīvavāda) we must postulate the existence of the vṛtti because this mod-
ification of the internal organ eliminates the veil of ignorance which covered the object. Thus,
the individual self is “caitanya conditioned [ = limited] by ignorance” (sā cāntaḥkaraṇavṛttir
āvaraṇābhibhavārthety ekaṃ matam | tathā hi avidyopahitacaitanyasya jīvatvapakṣe … ). The
other point of view presented in the VP (2000: 416–418) – probably borrowed from the Vedānta
Kaumudī – maintains that vṛtti operates a connection between pramātṛ and prameya.
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with the “consciousness limited by the object” (prameyācacchinnacaitanya), then
direct perception takes place.84
The VP contains the refined definition (pariṣkāra) of perception:
yogyavartamānaviṣayatve sati pramāṇacaitanyasya viṣayacaitanyābhinnatvam
“[Perceptuality of knowledge is] the unification of the consciousness of the object
with the consciousness of the means of knowledge, its object worthy of being
directly perceived and present [in that precise moment].”85 The VP exemplifies
this perceptual process of unification of the three aspects of caitanya as follows:
tatra yathā taḍāgodakaṃ chidrān nirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya
tadvad eva catuṣkoṇādyākāraṃ bhavati, tathā taijasam antaḥkaraṇam api
cakṣurādidvārā nirgatya ghaṭādiviṣayadeśaṃ gatvā ghaṭādiviṣayākāreṇa
pariṇamate, sa eva pariṇāmo vṛttir ity ucyate |
About this, for example, once having gone out from an opening and
having penetrated the field through irrigation ditches, the water of a
basin takes a quadrangular shape [ = corresponding to the form of the
fields themselves]. Similarly, once it has gone out through [sensory] canals
of sight and others and, once it has reached the place of the object, a jar or
whatever, the luminous internal organ also patterns itself after the shape
of the object, be it a jar or whatever. This very modification is called vṛtti.86
A few lines earlier, I mentioned perceptuality of the object
(viṣayagatapratyakṣatva). Remaining faithful to the undivided nature of caitanya
DR also offers the definition of viṣayagatapratyakṣatva: ghaṭāder viṣayasya
pratyakṣatvaṃ pramātrabhinnatvam “Perceptuality of the object, like a jar or
whatever, is non-difference from the perceiving subject”:87
pramātrabhedo nāma na tāvad aikyaṃ kintu
pramātṛsattātiriktasattākatvābhāvaḥ | tathā ca ghāṭādeḥ
svāvacchinnacaitanyādhyastatayā viṣayacaitanyasattaiva ghaṭādisattā
adhiṣṭhānasattātiriktatāyā āropitasattāyā anaṅgīkārāt |
viṣayacaitanyaṃ ca pūrvoktaprakāreṇa pramātṛcaitanyam eveti
pramātṛcaitanyasyaiva ghaṭādyadhiṣṭānatayā pramātṛsattaiva
84 Mayeda 1968–1969: 228–229; Bilimoria 1980b: 38–39 and Potter 1988: 107–108.
85 VP 2000: 101. The debate, which precedes this refined definition (pariṣkāra), is articulated in
many interesting points (VP 2000: 61, 64–66). For the complete discussion, see the VP (2000: 82)
and Gupta (1995: 167–200).
86 VP 2000: 63.
87 VP 2000: 85–86. Potter 1988: 108; Gupta 1995: 201–207.
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ghaṭādisattā nānyeti siddhaṃ ghaṭāder aparokṣatvam |
Therefore, non-difference from the knowing subject is not the identity
[with it], but the absence of a [degree of] reality apart from the exis-
tence of the knowing subject. Thus, since the jar and other objects are
superimposed on the consciousness limited by themselves, the existence
of the jar, etc. is nothing but the reality of the consciousness of the object.
In fact, a superimposed object existing independently from its own
substratum is not accepted. Conversely, in the previously-mentioned
way, the consciousness of the object is nothing but the consciousness of
the knowing subject; ergo, since the substratum of the jar and other
[objects] is just the consciousness of the knowing subject, the exis-
tence of the knowing subject is not different from the existence of the
jar and other [objects]. Thus, the direct perceptuality of the jar and other
[objects] becomes established.
In these lines the existence of the perceived entity depends solely upon the
perceiving subject, which is the reflection of caitanya on the internal organ.
Here, the empirical nature of the external object is not denied, but it is strongly
claimed that in order to cognize an object the attentive presence of the knowing
subject is fundamental. In addition to this “psychological” attitude, DR poses a
doctrinal tenet. Everything – be it physical, psychic or causal (see below 5.5)– is
superimposed on the self; furthermore, accepting that a superimposed object
can exist independently from its own substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) is absolutely
untenable.88
According to this reconstruction, in these passages two examples of
mutually connected paribhāṣās are recognizable. The first
(adhiṣṭhānasattātiriktatāyā āropitasattāyā anaṃgīkārāt) is a nominalized struc-
ture, which in Advaita serves to regulate such a perception. In fact, here the
systematizing function and the hermeneutical regulation are traceable. The pan-
Advaitin use is evident: everything is superimposed on a substratum which does
not take part in that same superimposition, but its reality allows a temporary
existence of that superimposed projection. The second paribhāṣā
(pramātṛcaitanyasyaiva ghaṭādyadhiṣṭānatayā pramātṛsattaiva ghaṭādisattā
nānyā) is a weaker offshoot of the first one. It is used to contextualize and
consequently, to conclude, the previous discussion, underlining the more gen-
eral range of the first.
88 Bina Gupta (1995: 128–129) explains the difference between adhiṣṭhāna and ādhāra while
discussing adhyāsa according to Sarvajñātman’s Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka (1.31–36).
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In another passage, DR himself seems to use the word paribhāṣā with
the meaning of definition.89 The discussion concerns the Advaitins’ refuta-
tion of Naiyāyikas’ understanding of universal property (jāti) and conditional
property (upādhi)90: jātitvopādhitvaparibhāṣāyāḥ sakalapramāṇāgocaratayā
’prāmāṇikatvāt “because, since the definition (paribhāṣā) of the property of
being a universal property and that of being a conditional property are not
the content of any means of knowledge, [both] are not authoritative”.91
Another remarkable vyavasthā, useful for Advaita understanding of the
theories of error (khyātivāda), is when DR formulates a differentiation between
a real modification (pariṇāma) and an apparent transformation (vivarta)92:
pariṇāmo nāma upādānasamasattākakāryāpattiḥ | vivarto nāma
upādānaviṣamasattākakāryāpattiḥ | prātibhāsikarajataṃ cāvidyāpekṣayā
pariṇāma iti caitanyāpekṣayā vivarta iti cocyate | avidyāpariṇāmarūpaṃ
ca tad rajatam avidyādhiṣṭhāne idamavacchinnacaitanye vartate, asman-
mate sarvasyāpi kāryasya svopādānāvidyādhiṣṭhānāśritatvaniyamāt |
Real modification is the arousal of an effect of the same [degree of] reality
as its material cause; apparent transformation is the arousal of an effect of
a different [degree of] reality from its material cause. The apparent silver is
said to be a real transformation with respect to ignorance and an apparent
transformation with respect to consciousness. Moreover, that silver, which
is an aspect of the real transformation of ignorance, appears on the
consciousness limited by “that” (idam),93 which is the substratum of
ignorance [related to “that”in fact, according to our point of view, as a
rule every effect actually lies on the substratum of ignorance which
constitutes its material cause.94
89 VP 2000: 75–76.
90 Pellegrini 2016b.
91 Gupta 1995: 191–194. DR leaves it to the readers’ śāstric background to reconstruct the
refutation of the definition of upādhi, while he is quite precise about jāti. Here DR seems to
reply to NSM’s definition (1988: 97–98): nityatve sati anekasamavetatvaṃ jātitvam “to be a
universal character is to be inherent in innumerable entities [ = particulars] while being quali-
fied by eternality”. Advaitins obviously cannot accept something that is eternal (nitya) other
than brahman; consequently, they do not even accept the relation of inherence
(samavāyasaṃbandha) considered eternal by Logicians. See also the BSBh 2.2.13–17.
92 VP 2000: 155–156.
93 For the meaning of idamavacchinnacaitanya within the khyātivāda and, specifically, in the
anirvacanīyakhyāti, see Pellegrini 2009: 78–79.
94 Gupta 1995: 261–262.
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In these passages DR defines pariṇāma and vivarta.95 He applies them to the
classical example of the silver (rajata) mistaken for the nacre (śukti) and main-
tains that this instance is a real transformation of the ignorance localized (āśrita)
on its own substratum (adhiṣṭhāna), that is consciousness. Here consciousness is
not in its pure state but limited by the nacre, whose cognition is partially given
as the substratum on which the illusion of silver is projected. That illusion is
concretized in the judgement “That is silver” (idaṃ rajatam), where “idam”
represents the object lying before (purovarti) the victim of the perceptual error
(vibhrama). Furthermore, in order to exist, ignorance needs a locus (āśraya) and
a content (viṣaya). Here its content is nacre and its locus is consciousness limited
by nacre, that nacre which lies before and is perceived just partially through the
word “that” (idam). In the end, DR claims for this statement a regulating status
(niyama) throughout the whole Advaita śāstra (asmanmate): sarvasyāpi kāryasya
svopādānāvidyādhiṣṭhānāśritatvaniyamāt.
According to Advaita Vedānta, every entity is substantially different from
brahman and essentially identical to it. The difference between these two milieux
can be expressed in many ways. Here it is understood that everything different
from brahman is a transient effect (kārya) because it has an origin as well as an
end (BG 2.27). In its aspect endowed with qualities (saguṇa), brahman is the
cause of causes (BSBh ad BS 1.1.2). Every effect is grounded in a material cause
(upādāna), which constitutes its solid body. This explains the first segment:
asmanmate sarvasyāpi kāryasya.
DR establishes a synthetic rule in order to comprehend the notions of vivarta
and pariṇāma. For Advaita Vedānta the empirical world (vyāvahārika) and the
illusory domain (prātibhāsika)96 are an apparent transformation (vivarta) of the
unchangeable brahman and a real transformation (pariṇāma) of ignorance
(avidyā/māyā). Saying that the world is a vivarta of brahman means that the
absolute reality of brahman is different (viṣama) from the reality of the empirical
universe.
Conversely, like the world, ignorance has an empirical status – or at most
an apparent one – and therefore has a reality (sattā) equal (sama) to that of its
own effect. Hence, the world is an effect of both – avidyā and brahman. In
these two ways of presenting the effect, only the ontological status of that
95 VS (Sadānanda 2004: 2–3, 8–9) refers to these two notions in this way: satattvato
’nyathāprathā vikāra ity udāhṛtaḥ | atattvato ’nyathāprathā vivarta ity udāhṛta iti | “A real
modification (vikāra= pariṇāma) has been defined as the effective mutation [of the material
cause]; [and] an apparent transformation (vivarta) has been defined as the illusory mutation [of
the material cause].”
96 On the three ontological levels of reality, see Pellegrini (2009: 79–81).
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presentation changes. The world is a pariṇāma type of effect when it shares the
same nature with its material cause, namely ignorance. In fact, ignorance is
the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) of the real transformation, namely the
empirical universe. On the other hand, brahman is the material cause of that
same effect, seen as apparent transformation (vivartopādāna). Thus the second
part of the restricting rule (niyama) is explained: svopādānāvidyā-, where sva-
means “one effect or another” (tattatkārya).
To explain the last section of the paribhāṣā: -adhiṣṭhānāśritatva-, we must
remember that in Advaita Vedānta ignorance is eventually false (mithyā), so it
needs a real and immutable substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) on which to be placed
(āśrita). This is brahman, the material cause of the apparent transformation
(vivarta) of the empirical universe.
This paribhāṣā exhibits a nominalized structure with a noun in the genitive
accompanied by a causal ablative of an abstract term. Here the abstract term
does not occupy the final position of the compound, because the last word is
niyama- (in the ablative), which underlies the restrictive and regulative character
of the entire statement.
Reading this accommodation as a whole, we find that brahman is the
unchanging substratum of everything. On brahman lies avidyā which, in
turn, is directly responsible for every other empirical effect. Therefore, brah-
man is only involved in the creative process because it is the substratum on
which lies avidyā which, since it is its true authoress, shares its own nature
with any worldly effect whatsoever. Conversely, the text again remarks that
finally, everything is based on consciousness, whose absolute reality (sat)
lends and allows other entities a certain degree of reality, be it empirical or
illusory.
This paribhāṣā can be taken into consideration on several occasions. For
instance, in the field of the theory of error, where the effect of avidyā – located
on consciousness for vivaraṇa – is as illusory as the silver superimposed on the
nacre or, in the phenomenal domain, where the effect of avidyā is not just a
perceptual error but the empirical world itself.97
97 Potter (1988: 105–106) briefly indicates another interesting point of the VP (2000: 182), namely
the difference between nivṛtti and bādha: kāryavināśo hi dvividhaḥ | kaścid upādānena saha kaścit
tu vidyamāne evopādāne | ādyo bādhaḥ, dvitīyas tu nivṛttiḥ | “Destruction of an effect is indeed
twofold: some [effects are destroyed] together with their material cause, while other [effects are
destroyed] when their material cause indeed persists: the first is a cessation while the second is a
withdrawal.” For a somewhat similar lexical choice, see PP/PPV, Padmapādācārya 1992: 108.
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6.2 Anumānapariccheda
In every epistemological treatise, after perception we find inference (anumāna).
The VP repeats this scheme.98 I shall present here just a single instance of what I
consider a paribhāṣā.
The discussion focuses on how many types of invariable concomitance can
generate corresponding inferences.99 DR’s premise is that the Advaitins do not
accept Naiyāyikas’ threefold inferential classification: jointly positive and
negative (anvayavyatireki), purely positive (kevalānvayi) and purely negative
(kevalavyatireki).100 This classification is based on the invariable concomitance
(vyāpti), which can be positive (anvayavyāpti)101 or negative (vyatirekavyāpti).102
According to the Naiyāyikas, the anvayavyatireki type of inference has both
kinds of invariable concomitance, the positive as well as the negative. The
judgement “mountain has fire because it is smoky” is based on two premises:
1. wherever there is smoke there is fire, just as in a kitchen ( = anvaya), and
2. wherever there is not fire there is not even smoke, just as in a lake
( = vyatireka).103 Bearing this in mind, DR replies:
tac cānumānam anvayirūpam ekam eva, na tu kevalānvayi | sarvasyāpi
dharmasyāsmanmate brahmaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvena aty-
antābhāvāpratiyogisādhyakatvarūpakevalānvayitvasyā ’siddheḥ |
… and that inference is only one, of the positive type, but not purely positive.
In fact, according to our point of view, since every attribute is endowed
with the property of counter-positiveness of a constant absence occur-
ring in brahman, then the property of being purely positive – whose
nature is possessing a probandum which is not the counter-positive of
any constant absence whatsoever – cannot be established.104
98 Satprakashananda 2001: 142–143.
99 Brunner 1987: 106–108; Mādhavānanda 1997: 73–75; VP, Dharmarājādhvarīndra 1984: 55–56.
100 TrS 2007: 105.
101 Where the probans (hetu) is positively connected with the probandum (sādhya) and the invari-
able concomitance is determined by the observation of the co-existence of two present objects:
“wherever there is the pervaded, there is the pervasor” (yatra yatra vyāpyaḥ tatra tatra vyāpakaḥ).
102 The probans (hetu) is negatively connected with the probandum (sādhya), and the invariable
concomitance is determined by the observation of the co-existence of two absent objects and is
presented in reverse with respect to the anvayavyāpti: “wherever there is the absence of the pervasor,
there is the absence of the pervaded” (yatra yatra vyāpakābhāvaḥ tatra tatra vyāpyābhāvaḥ).
103 TrS 2007: 101.
104 Satprakashananda 2001: 150–152. Endowed with this property are kevalānvayin entities
(padārtha), translated as “unnegatable term, universal” by Ingalls (1988: 61–62, 113–115) or
“universally present” by Matilal (1968: 80).
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DR accepts only the positive type of inference, which is different from the purely
positive (kevalānvayi) as well.105 The kevalānvayi inference is based only on the
positive invariable concomitance (anvayamātravyāptika): “wherever there is the
probans, there is the probandum” (yatra yatra hetus tatra tatra sādhyam). The
Naiyāyikas maintain the existence of universally present properties (kevalānvayi)
such as “knowability” (jñeyatva/prameyatva), “nominability” (abhidheyatva/
vācyatva), etc. Technically speaking, these properties cannot ever be the coun-
ter-positive (apratiyogin) of their own constant absence (atyantābhāva). The purely
positive inference does not have a negative instance (vipakṣa:
niścitasādhyābhāvavān vipakṣaḥ “the negative instance surely possesses the
absence of the probandum”), that is to say that in the universe there is no locus
whatsoever where the above-mentioned properties do not reside.106 On the con-
trary, the purely negative inference (kevalavyatireki) is based on the negative
invariable concomitance (vyatirekamātravyāptika) “wherever there is not the pro-
bandum, there is not even the probans” (yatra sādhyaṃ nāsti tatra hetur api nāsti)
and does not have any positive instance (sapakṣa: niścitasādhyavān sapakṣaḥ
“the positive instance surely possesses the probandum”).107
The analysis of atyantābhāvāpratiyogisādhyakatvarūpa- should be con-
ducted as follows. It is impossible to establish an entity only through an
unproven thesis (pratijñāmātrā): we need evidence (pramāṇa)! If Advaitins
do not accept the threefold kind of inference, they must ground their refutation
on solid bases. For this reason, DR displays the problem of the untenability of
kevalānvayitva property and, as a consequence, the impossibility of an infer-
ence whose probandum (sādhya) is such a universally present property, which
is not the counter-positive (a-pratiyogin) of a constant absence. An inference
with such a probandum is unacceptable for Advaitins because it openly contra-
dicts the passage “Here there is not anything [= nothing] manifold” (neha
nānāsti kiṃcana, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.19; Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.10).
Following the text: in brahman (iha) there is the constant absence
(antyantābhāva) of all entities; ergo, Advaita Vedānta considers every entity
the counter-positive of a constant absence occurring in brahman. In fact, in
brahman there are no attributes/properties such as “nominability”
105 DR does not accept purely negative inference (kevalavyatireki) either, because he does not
admit any invariable concomitance grounded on absence (vyatireka). In fact, the Advaitins
consider vyatireka an example of presumption (arthāpatti). For them, non-acceptance of the
vyatireki type of inference also determines the impossibility of the mixed type of inference, the
anvayavyatireki (VP 2000: 223–228).
106 TrS 2007: 109.
107 TrS 2007: 108.
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(abhidheyatva), “knowability” (prameyatva), etc., because it is beyond the
range of senses, words and mind (avāṅmanasagocara, see the Taittirīya
Upaniṣad 2.4.1). Hence brahman, which cannot be expressed through words,
is not endowed with a property such as “nominability” (abhidheyatva); or,
since it is not an object to be known through any means of knowledge, it is not
even endowed with “knowability” (prameyatva). As a consequence, properties
called by Naiyāyikas kevalānvayi do not occur in brahman, ergo, they are the
counter-positives (pratiyogin) of their own constant absence in brahman, cer-
tainly not the non-counter-positives (a-pratiyogin) of their own constant
absence.108 Hence, if no kevalānvayi property exists how can the cogency of
an inference whose probandum is constituted by such a property be main-
tained?109 In fact, such an inference would be flawed by the “unestablishment
of the qualification” (viśeṣaṇāsiddhi = sādhyāsiddhi).
The paribhāṣā here discussed presents the usual structure and is of course
applicable in all similar circumstances.
6.3 Āgamapariccheda
Next110 there is āgamapariccheda, where the basic principles of the Advaita
philosophy of language are dealt with. Bilimoria’s already-mentioned and
widely-debated111 volume has highlighted the intricacies of the subject, present-
ing the controversies between Nyāya, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa and
Advaita.112 DR fills the entire section with several definitions and consequent
discussions. Hereafter, in order to avoid another lengthy analysis, I shall limit
myself to a passage, which shows the structure of the later philosophical
paribhāṣās, where what is exhibited is a character jointly meta-linguistic, reg-
ulating and slightly hermeneutical.
108 I follow Śivadatta’s Arthadīpikā gloss on the VP/AD (1983: 117).
109 We experience a constant absence (antyantābhāva) through its counter-positive (pratiyo-
gin) by means of a sentence such as “There is no jar” (ghaṭo nāsti). For Logicians this kind of
absence is without beginning or end, therefore constant because connected with three times
(traikālikasaṃbandhāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāvaḥ “an absence whose counter-positiveness is
limited by a relation with the threefold time”, TrS 2007: 171). Thus, if this kind of absence
pervades all time, its counter-positive (pratiyogin) is not, was not and will not ever be.
110 In DR’s very short presentation of upamāna in the VP (2000: 245–257) there are no clear
examples of meta-linguistic style, interpretative rules or well-structured systematizations. DR
simply defines upamāna and briefly discusses and justifies its definition.
111 See Bronkhorst (1993: 103–105), Phillips (1995: 273–279) and again Bronkhorst (1998: 5–14).
112 Bilimoria 2008 [I ed. 1988].
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Once he has presented the generalities of verbal testimony
(āgamapramāṇa)113 and the four causes114 of verbal knowledge (śābdabodha),
DR introduces a discussion on the powers and functions of the word capable of
conveying meanings:
padārthaś ca dvividhaḥ – śakyo lakṣyaś ceti | tatra śaktir nāma padānām
artheṣu mukhyā vṛttiḥ | yathā ghaṭapadasya pṛthubudhnodarādyākṛtiviśiṣṭe
vastuviśeṣe vṛttiḥ | sā ca śaktiḥ padārthāntaram, siddhānte kāraṇeṣu
kāryānukūlaśaktimātrasya padārthāntaratvāt | sā ca tattatpada-
janyapadārthajñānarūpakāryānumeyā | tādṛśaśaktiviṣayatvaṃ śakyatvam |
The meaning of the morphemes is of two types: literal and implied. About
this, the literal potency (śakti) is the primary function of words towards
[their] meanings. For example, the primary function of the word “jar” occurs
in a particular object characterized by the shape of a large and bulging
belly, etc. Such a potency is an independent category! In fact, in [our]
doctrine the mere effect-generating-potency is a separate category
[included] among causes. This [potency], inferable by the effects,115 takes
the form of the knowledge of the meaning of the terms which has arisen
from one word or another. The property of being the primary meaning is to
be the referent of such a potency.116
Hidden in this brief passage is a pāribhāṣika phrase: siddhānte kāraṇeṣu
kāryānukūlaśaktimātrasya padāntaratvāt.
The underlying debate here concerns the opposing positions of Nyāyā and
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, mainly of the Prābhākara school. The bone of contention
concerns śakti: is it a separate and independent category (padārthāntara) or
not? Here the word śakti does not mean only “power, potency” but “causal
efficacy” and “potential meaning”. On these issues, the Advaitins accept the
Mīmāṃsakas’ empirical point of view (see infra fn. 60) according to which śakti
is a separate category.
113 VP 2000: 259.
114 See the VP (2000: 261) and Bilimoria (1980a: 393–399; 2008: 31–51).
115 Mīmāṃsakas seem to agree with Grammarians (vaiyākaraṇa) when they affirm that it is not
even possible to postulate the idea of a grammatical case (kāraka) without recognizing a śakti.
The word “activity” (vyāpāra), as used by Vaiyākaraṇas, has the same purport as śakti: both are
known by their results. In the M (ad A 1.3.1, Patañjali 1985–2002: 254) Patañjali has the same
idea about action (kriyā): kriyā nāmeyam atyantāparidṛṣṭā … sāsāu anumānagamyā “What is
called action is totally invisible … that is knowable through inference …”
116 VP 2000: 287–288.
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The school of Nyāya, the old and the new, does not accept śakti as an
independent category (padārtha) as the Mīmāṃsakas do. According to the
Logicians it is not necessary to postulate a new category like śakti, when the
same function is satisfied by the essential nature (svabhāva) of an entity. For
example, the Logician Haridāsa Bhaṭṭācārya, while glossing Udayana’s
Nyāyakusumāñjalī ([hereafter NK] 1.5–7) understands śakti as causality
(kāraṇatva).117 At first Haridāsa presents the Mīmāṃsakas’ position, saying
that śakti is an independent category of multiple nature, different in different
objects: eternal in eternal entities and non-eternal in non-eternal entities.118
Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the cause of a phenomenon is something that
necessarily has a potency (śakti): for instance, a piece of clay has the potency
of generating a jar. Only when an entity is endowed with that potency can it be
completely considered an agent (kāraka) or a cause (kāraṇa). The Mīmāṃsakas
try to establish their theory by furnishing valid evidence. Since potency is
beyond the range of the senses (atīndriya) it is cognized through the process
of presumption (arthāpatti). This process can be exemplified by assuming that
fire has the power to burn (dāhikā śakti), otherwise the relation between fire and
its burning potency cannot be explained (anyathānupapatti).119
Naiyāyikas vehemently oppose the inclusion of śakti as a distinct category.
They point out that śakti is nothing but the essential nature (svabhāva) of an
entity, which is a property inseparable from and inherent to the entity itself. For
example, the potency to burn is not different from the fire itself. In fact, a fire
without its heat, which is its intrinsic nature, cannot be imagined.
This discussion is implicit in the pāribhāṣika phrase just quoted. Along the
lines of the paribhāṣās already described, it prompts me to recall that paribhāṣās
could also be seen as conventions (saṃketa) or somehow synthetic revealers or
117 Miśra 1997: 23–32. Naiyāyikas do not completely refuse the notion of śakti, but they prefer
to speak about kāraṇatva – the property of being a cause or causality – charging it with śakti’s
peculiarities. This property is the potency (śakti) through which an entity becomes the cause of
certain effects. Although not acknowledging that śakti has an independent position, in the NK
(1.13, Upādhyāya-Śāstrī 2002: 150) Udayana does not completely refute it, identifying it with
kāraṇatva: atha śaktiniṣedhe kiṃ pramāṇaṃ? na kiñcit | tat kim asty eva? bāḍhaṃ, nahi no
darśane śaktipadārtha eva nāsti | ko ’sau tarhi? kāraṇatvam “[Objection:] Now, what is the proof
for refuting śakti? [Reply:] There is none! [Objection:] Then what’s this [refutation] for? [Reply:]
Well, it is not that from our point of view there is not a category [called] śakti. [Objection:] So,
what is that? [Reply:] [That is] the property of being a causality.”
118 Haridāsīvṛtti ad NK 1.6 (Miśra 1997: 26–27): śaktiś ca padārthāntaraṃ prativyakti nānā,
anitye ’nityā nityaiva sā śaktir anitye bhāvahetujā “Potency is an independent category, multiple
in every individual, non-eternal in what is not eternal and eternal in what is eternal. In what is
not eternal this potency is born out of a positive cause.”
119 Chakravarti 1940: 34–40.
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indicators of certain traces of wider debates held somewhere else in the discipline.
Often, through a few words utilized in the usual style, these indicators seem to
carry out the task of referring the reader to a more cogent philosophical position
concerning the issue under examination.120
6.4 Anupalabdhipariccheda
I shall now go directly to the section of non-apprehension (anupalabdhiparic-
cheda),121 where there are several examples of paribhāṣā, even though I shall
analyze only one of them with the usual structure, thus helping us to interpret
and answer various questions concerning the fourfold absence.122
An interesting passage occurs in the discussion on the absence subsequent
to destruction (dhvaṃsābhāva), which is simply the destruction of an entity
when that entity has withdrawn into its material cause: like a jar, once destroyed
by a mace, re-enters its immediate cause or ground (adhikaraṇa), namely the
half part (kapāla).123 Once its immediate ground is destroyed, the previous
dhvaṃsābhāva is destroyed,124 too, and the half part returns as the clay out of
which the jar was made.125 In an open polemic with the Naiyāyikas, DR adds
that it cannot be accepted that the destruction of the destruction of the jar
(ghaṭadhvaṃsadhvaṃsa) will bring the same jar back to life. This is untenable
because the destruction of a destruction of a jar is simply a destruction, whose
counter-positive is the destroyed object, i. e. the jar.126 If we were to accept the
Logicians’ position, then when a jar – whose nature is of the destruction of its
antecedent absence – is destroyed, we would have to face the undesired event of
the re-emergence of the antecedent absence already destroyed. Enclosing it in a
somehow parenthetic clause-phrase (na ca … vācyam), DR reports one of the
120 Devasthali 1985: 1 n. 1.
121 See the VP (2000: 344).
122 See the VP (2000: 344).
123 The kapāla is a wet lump of clay not yet baked and similar to half a skullcap. Once joined
with the other half, it gives shape to the jar to be baked. These two kapālas are the jar’s
immediate material causes.
124 For Naiyāyikas the dhvaṃsābhāva has a beginning (sādi) but has no end (ananta), because
destruction cannot be destroyed (TrS 2007: 170).
125 Without mentioning other intermediate stages, here I am simplifying the process leading a
jar back to its clay condition.
126 VP (2000: 353): tatraiva ghaṭasya mudgarapātānantaraṃ yo ’bhāvaḥ sa dhvaṃsābhāvaḥ |
dhvaṃsasyāpi svādhikaraṇakapālanāśe nāśa eva | na ca ghaṭonmajjanāpattiḥ
ghaṭadhvaṃsadhvaṃsasyāpi ghaṭapratiyogikadhvaṃsatvāt |. I follow Śivadatta’s AD interpre-
tation (1983: 215).
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Naiyāyikas’ replies where they maintain that it is not possible to accept the
destruction of destruction when the substratum of that destruction is eternal.
Regarding this the Logicians ask the Advaitins to elaborate their position. That
is: if they think that the destruction of a certain entity/effect is also destructible,
then they must explain whether all destructions are ephemeral or only a few of
them. For instance, if the destruction of an eternal substance (nityadravya) takes
place – be it time (kāla), space (dik) or consciousness (caitanya) – it cannot be
considered ephemeral, because according to the Naiyāyikas whatever resides on
an eternal substratum is also eternal. If the Advaitins were to be bound to revise
their position regarding a single destruction related to an eternal substance and
thus consider it eternal, then why not reconsider all destructions eternal, even
those taking place on other substrata?127
The Advaitins refute the Naiyāyikas’ position. First of all, it cannot be
maintained that the substratum of the destruction of a jar is time or space
because all philosophers accept kapāla as the material cause of the jar and,
consequently, as the substratum of the destruction of that jar.
Later on, the Advaitins try to accept for a while the position of the Logicians.
They admit temporarily that a substratum of destruction might be something
eternal. Nevertheless, they question the Logicians according to Advaita tenets: is
such an eternal substratum of destruction different (bhinna) from brahman-
caitanya or is it brahman-caitanya? They refute both these options:
tādṛśādhikaraṇaṃ yadi caitanyavyatiriktaṃ tadā tasya nityatvam asidd-
ham, brahmavyatiriktasya sarvasya brahmajñānanirvartyatāyā
vakṣyamāṇatvāt | yadi ca dhvaṃsādhikaraṇaṃ caitanyaṃ tadā ’siddhiḥ,
āropitapratiyogikapradhvaṃsasyādhiṣṭhāne
pratīyamānasyādhikaraṇamātratvāt | tad uktam – adhiṣṭhānāvaśeṣo hi
nāśaḥ kalpitavastunaḥ – iti | evaṃ śuktirūpyavināśo ’pīdamavacchinna-
caitanyam eva |
If such a substratum is different from consciousness then its eternality is not
proven, because we will affirm128 that whatever is different from brah-
man is sublated by the knowledge of brahman. If, on the other hand, the
substratum is consciousness itself, then [in this case also] there is an
incongruence because a destruction, whose counter-positive is a
127 VP (2000: 354–355): na caivam api yatra dhvaṃsādhikaraṇaṃ nityaṃ tatra kathaṃ
dhvaṃsanāśa iti vācyam. Here again I follow the reading of the AD.
128 This sentence, too, has the structure and characteristics of an organizing paribhāṣā,
perhaps just within the boundaries of the VP, since it refers to another section of the text,
namely the prayojanapariccheda.
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superimposed entity [= an erroneous perception] and which is percep-
tible on [its own] substratum, is nothing but the mere substratum
itself. In fact, it has been said: “The destruction of a superimposed entity
is but the reduction to [its] substratum.” [Ṛbhu Gītā 2.55]. Thus, the destruc-
tion of silver on the nacre is also indeed consciousness limited by “that”
(idam).129
Here there is a typical paribhāṣā of the VP: āropitapratiyogi-
kapradhvaṃsasyādhiṣṭhāne pratīyamānasyādhikaraṇamātratvāt. It has two
levels of interpretation: one concerning the empirical world and the other
concerning illusions. On the first level, the sentence points out that the destruc-
tion of an entity is nothing but the mere substratum of that entity. The second
level states the same thing while applying the structure to perceptual errors and
illusory entities cognized on a certain locus. Destruction of their cognition
simply means perception of the substratum on which illusion is projected
(adhiṣṭhānasākṣātkāra). Hence, jointly applying these levels of interpretation,
the paribhāṣā seems to say that consciousness is the unchanging substratum of
the empirical and of the apparent world as well. Destruction of the world is
nothing but the perception of its substratum, that is brahman.130
6.5 Viṣayapariccheda
The viṣayapariccheda is one of the VP’s larger sections, where DR shifts his
attention from epistemology to ontology and cosmology.131 Within this and in
the last pariccheda, the nature of the VP, jointly introductory and anthological,
allows the treatment of several positions internal to Advaita Vedānta.
DR divides dissolution (pralaya) into four types, one of which is daily
dissolution, namely deep sleep (suṣupti). His treatment of deep sleep is extre-
mely innovative.132 Deep sleep represents the withdrawal within their own cause
of all empirical effects – namely the awakening condition (jāgṛtāvasthā) –
129 VP 2000: 355–356.
130 For instance, this paribhāṣā could also be applied to the opening debate of the
Advaitasiddhi’s second definition of falsity (Pellegrini 2011: 445–446).
131 In this section the object of Advaita Vedānta is dealt with, taking from the conditioned
(sopādhika) and unconditioned (nirupādhika) forms of brahman, to the primary (śakya) and
implied (lakṣya) meanings of the word tat (“that”= brahman) in the mahāvākya “You are That”
(tat tvam asi, Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.8.7 ff.) and of the word tvam (“you”= the individual self).
132 These are the four pralayas: daily (nitya), natural (prākṛtika), occasional (naimittika) and
total (ātyantika). See the VP (2000: 395).
… And What about the Vedānta Paribhāṣā’s paribhāṣātva? 633
together with the psychic ones – namely the dream condition (svapnāvasthā).
DR explains that merits and demerits merge entirely into the causal condition
(kāraṇāvasthā) and subsist therein in a latent state. That is why on awakening,
the individual regains the memory of his preceding experiences and
sensations.133
At this point a problem arises: during deep sleep, for the sleeping individual
every entity – be it physical or psychic – is reabsorbed into the causal ignorance,
and everything ceases being manifest.134 In Advaita physiology deep sleep
corresponds to the sheet made of beatitude (ānandamayakośa) and to the causal
body (kāraṇaśarīra). Out of this state, with the addition of accidents, all con-
stituents of the individual self (jīva) are produced. The psychic, or better the
subtle, body – namely the dream condition – merges into the causal body, that
is the deep sleep condition. The subtle body is made up of three sheets: the
sheet made of vital breaths (prāṇamayakośa), the sheet made of mind
(manomayakośa) and the sheet made of intellect (vijñānamayakośa). During
deep sleep the sheet made of mind and that made of intellect cease their activity
and are reabsorbed within their cause, namely the ānandamayakośa. On the
contrary, the sheet made of vital breaths, namely five prāṇas, remains awake
and active, otherwise death of the physical body would occur. At this point a
problem arises: how is only a partial merging of the subtle body into its cause
possible?135 The feeling is that during deep sleep, the internal organ – once it
has entered into the subtle channels called hitā – leaves the subtle body under
the control of the breaths136:
na ca suṣuptāv antaḥkaraṇasya vināśena tadadhīnaprāṇādikriyānupa-
pattiḥ, vastutaḥ śvāsādyabhāve ’pi tadupalabdheḥ puruṣāntaravibhra-
mamātratvāt, suṣuptaśarīropalaṃbhavat | na caivaṃ suptasya paretād
aviśeṣaḥ, suptasya hi liṃgaśarīraṃ saṃskārātmanātraiva vartate paretasya
tu lokāntara iti vailakṣaṇyāt | yad vā antaḥkaraṇasya dve śaktī
jñānaśaktiḥ kriyāśaktiś ceti | tatra jñānaśaktiviśiṣṭāntaḥkaraṇasya
suṣuptau vināśo, na kriyāśaktiviśiṣṭasyeti prāṇādyavasthānam avirudd-
ham |
It should not even be claimed that since during deep sleep the internal
133 See the VP (2000: 395–396).
134 See Kaivalya Upāniṣad 1.13.
135 See also Śaṃkara’s commentaries ad Praśna Upāniṣad 4.3–4 and BSBh ad 1.3.8.
136 According to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upāniṣad (2.1.17–20) there are seventy-two thousand hitā
canals. They are subtle canals departing from the heart and reaching the pineal gland (purītat);
within these canals prāṇa moves while the individual is deeply asleep.
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organ is nullified, [then] the activity of the prāṇa and other [vital breaths]
which depend on it [ = the internal organ] is not possible. The reason is
indeed that also while the breath is absent [its] perception is [due] merely
to the perceptual delusion of another person [who observes the sleeping
man], just as what happens with the perception of [his own] body by the
sleeping man [himself]. Neither [can it be said] that there is no difference
between a sleeping man and a deceased one, because there is indeed a
distinction: [while] the subtle body of the sleeping man remains in that
precise place (atraiva [ = the gross body]) in the form of a residual impres-
sion, [the subtle body] of a dead man goes to the next world. Otherwise, [it
should be postulated that] two potencies of the internal organ exist:
the knowledge-potency and the action-potency. In that case, during
deep sleep, there is the suspension of the internal organ character-
ized by the knowledge-potency, not that characterized by the action-
potency. Ergo, it is not contradictory [to hold] the persistence of prāṇa and
other [vital breaths also during deep sleep].
Here DR furnishes two explanations for this phenomenon. The first is not
philosophically cogent, but the second one shows a consistent effort to solve
the inconsistency: the sleeping man is not conscious of his breaths, whose
movement continues spontaneously. In this passage I perceive a meta-regulating
nuance because this discussion could be used as a demonstration and settle-
ment also in earlier texts, wherever the objector has proposed a similar doubt.
6.6 Prayojananapariccheda
The last section of the VP deals with the purpose of Advaita and is called
prayojanapariccheda. DR indicates two purposes: the primary (mukhya) and
the secondary (gauṇa). Obviously, the primary purpose is the attainment of
bliss and the removal of any sufferings. The secondary one is the identification
and consequent pursuit of all those means through which the primary purpose
becomes achievable.137 In the mukhyaprayojana as well there are two levels:
relative (sātiśaya) and absolute (niratiśaya). The relative level concerns the
specific pleasures and tiny delights, whereas the absolute deals with the
achievement of brahman itself, the supreme beatitude (Bṛhadāraṇyaka
Upaniṣad 3.9.28, 4.3.32; Taittirīya Upaniṣad 3.6).
137 VP 2000: 435–437.
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One of the paribhāṣās identified in this pariccheda briefly deals with the
nature of liberation (mokṣa).138 Besides the quotations, this formula shows its
pāribhāṣika structure with a pair of nearly aphoristic expressions:
sa ca jñānaikasādhyaḥ “tam eva viditvā ’ti mṛtyum eti, nānyaḥ panthā
vidyate ’yanāya” iti śruteḥ, ajñānanivṛtteḥ jñānaikasādhyatvaniyamāc ca
| tac ca jñānaṃ brahmātmaikyagocaram “abhayaṃ vai janaka prāpto
’si”, “tadātmānam evāved ahaṃ brahmāsmi” iti śruteḥ |
And that one [= liberation] is attainable only through knowledge, as
[assumed] by the textual passage “Only after having known That, he
overcomes death: there is no other way for reaching there.” [Śvetāśvatara
Upaniṣad 3.8]. In fact, as a rule, the cessation of ignorance is attainable
only through knowledge, and that knowledge has as its content the
identity of brahman with the self, as [witnessed] by śruti “Have you
indeed attained absence of fear, oh Janaka!” [Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
4.2.4], “Then he knew only the self: ‘I am brahman!’!” [Bṛhadāraṇyaka
Upaniṣad 1.4.10].139
Here we find three synthetic formulations of the same nature. While the first one
jñānaikasādhyaḥ is a plain statement, the second one expresses in the usual
pāribhāṣika style the same concept in an assertive way (ajñānanivṛtteḥ
jñānaikasādhyatvaniyamāt), underscoring the fact that liberation is attainable
only through knowledge and that this knowledge is nothing but total cessation
of ignorance. According to Advaita Vedānta this is an inviolable rule (niyama),
which somehow restricts and cuts off the possibility of attaining liberation also
by other means. Besides this paribhāṣā, we have an elucidation about the nature
of knowledge, which is capable of destroying ignorance and leading to libera-
tion. This is the highest axiom of Advaita: mokṣa is the direct experience
(sākṣātkāra) of the identity of the individual self with the absolute (jñānaṃ
brahmātmaikyagocaram).
Towards the end of the section140 DR discusses the nature of action (karman)
and its results. As often happens in Advaita texts, the examination is undertaken
after an objection. Here there is a problem: how to explain in the condition of
living liberation the arousal of ripe results of actions previously taken
(prārabdhakarman). In the usual way, DR replies by quoting some sentences
from śruti (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.14.2) and smṛti (Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa 29.76).
138 See the VP (2000: 436–437).
139 VP 2000: 442.
140 VP 2000: 467.
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He interprets those passages stating that through liberating knowledge two
types of action are removed along with their results: the action which is taking
place (kriyamānakarman) and the accumulated one which has not yet begun to
bestow its results (saṃcitakarman). On the other hand, the prārabdhakarman
still persists, because it is consumed simply by enjoying its results.141
The pūrvapakṣin refutes these clarifications stating that if knowledge of
brahman destroys ignorance, how is it possible that a result of ignorance such
as prārabdhakarman still lasts even if its cause is demolished? This determines
the deviation (vyabhicāra) from a rule accepted by everyone, in conformity with
the interpretative maxim nimittābhāve naimittikasyāpy abhāvaḥ “when there is
not the cause there is not even effect”142:
nanu brahmajñānān mūlājñānanivṛttau tatkāryaprārabdhakarmaṇo ’pi
nivṛtteḥ kathaṃ jñānināṃ dehadhāraṇam upapadyate iti cet | na,
apratibaddhajñānasyaivājñānanivartakatayā prārabdhakarmarūpa-
pratibandhakadaśāyām ajñānanivṛtter anaṅgīkārāt |
[Objection:] But, if with the knowledge of brahman radical ignorance
withdraws, then the cessation of that action that is already giving its
results, which is the effect of that [ = ignorance] should also occur.
[Therefore,] how to explain the persistence of the body of the sages?
[Reply:] It is not like that! In fact, since only an unbounded knowledge
can dispel ignorance, the cessation of ignorance when a hindrance as the
action which is already bestowing its results is [still] present cannot be
accepted.
Here, too, we are facing the usual structure of the formulation, but this time it is a
specification and a settlement of precise doctrine. Only a complete, incontrovertible
and unbounded knowledge can uproot ignorance. On the other hand,
prārabdhakarman is completely consumed only through the direct fruition of its
results. This represents the obstacle which prevents liberating knowledge from
immediately causing the fall of the body along with any other effects of avidyā.
This is the difference between living liberation (jīvanmukti) and the incorporeal
liberation (videhamukti), achievable after death once the effects of
prārabdhakarman are eventually annihilated. This discussion is a reminder that
every Advaita author must agree that even in living liberation, the presence of a
141 VP 2000: 466.
142 This nyāya is included in Ṭhakuradatta Śarma’s compendium Bhuvaneśalaukikanyāyasāhasrī
(1989: 188–189). The same rule is otherwise expressed as nimittāpaye naimittikāpayaḥ. See also
Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.2.1 and 1.4.2 (kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ). See Candotti-Pontillo, this volume.
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trifle of ignorance (avidyāleśa) must be postulated. This trifle is nothing but
prārabdhakarman, which contrasts the instant downfall of the body
(sadyadehapāta).
7 Conclusions
Throughout these pages the issue of why we find text titles such as Vedānta
Paribhāṣā in the later period has been raised. As a consequence, I have tried to
highlight some of the features which led DR to choose the title paribhāṣā for his
text, inserting it in a precise textual context. The pāribhāṣika nature of the VP
obviously differs considerably from the formalizations of the original paribhāṣā,
supposedly traceable in the Śrautasūtras and extensively developed by
Vyākaraṇa and then used as nyāyas by the ritualistic Mīmāṃsā.
We should in fact bear in mind that for a long period, it was primarily the
Vyākaraṇa which contributed to specifying the paribhāṣā corpus. In my opinion,
across the centuries this tendency encouraged new philosophical endeavors,
especially when the New Logic arose and became widespread. From the thir-
teenth to the eighteenth century we see a flourishing of texts called paribhāṣā
(or bhāṣā), even though their style is different from the extremely concise one of
the original paribhāṣās. It seems that due to the diffusion of the ultra-technical
terminology and methodology of Navya Nyāya, the characteristics of the old
paribhāṣās flowed into the new stylistic rules. We are facing on one side, a de-
technicalization of a technical term and on the other, a specification of a non-
technical use of the same term. This might have caused a requalification and
diffusion of the well-known term paribhāṣā as a title for didactic treatises.
Furthermore, the word also assumes a new kind of formalization and a peculiar
purport analogous to a “technical definition” expressed in the navya style. This
involves an entire philosophical debate, which beginning with a definition
passes through a complex discussion and reaches a doctrinal settlement and a
consequent final refined definition (pariṣkāra).
As far as the VP is concerned, the above-mentioned is certainly the essential
factor on which the founding concept of the text subtends together with its internal
structure. Although the VP displays some peculiarities, when comparing it with
other paribhāṣā-texts of the same period we can see various analogies: its basic
idea, the structure, the style, the terminology, the contents and, of course, its target.
The VP can be defined paribhāṣā in a very broad sense of the term because
some typical tendencies of the classical paribhāṣā literature are traceable in it.
Simultaneously, its paribhāṣika formalization is not specified as in the
paribhāṣās of other disciplines.
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In fact, I believe that in the VP’s case, the essential factor of its paribhāṣātva
is a concomitant cluster of characteristics. Of course I understand that the
viewpoint I am presenting could be adapted to any philosophical writing of
DR’s period. However, I reaffirm that what makes the VP a paribhāṣā is a
combination of concauses. The VP’s primary purpose is clarity and precision
for beginners, along with the application of this intent to the philosophical
requirements of the period.
It can be stated that the VP is not as concise as the original paribhāṣās.
Around VP’s period (apart perhaps from grammarians such as Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa,
who were closer to the ancient paribhāṣā tradition),143 the structure of
paribhāṣā-texts changes. In new paribhāṣās the title conveys several character-
istics: at one and the same time they are introductory textbooks, full-fledged
philosophical treatises and elucidations.
What I can now conclude is that in the VP, and in analogous texts, the word
paribhāṣā is taken to mean “discussing around/beyond, talking/elucidating by
taking the whole system into consideration”, which further suggests the meaning
“re-arranging an older system by taking the principles that were mentioned or
implicit in that system but were not given the role of building blocks”. With this
way of recasting a system a different but complimentary understanding of it or its
literature emerges, so that what were underpinnings come to the surface and offer
an updated introduction to it.
These thoughts prompt me to consider that in the VP there are various levels
of application of the notion of paribhāṣā and a consequent difficulty in translat-
ing the term univocally. The VP is a paribhāṣā in the most general sense as well
as in a more specific one. The entire text is an ample paribhāṣā (“manual of
elucidation”) because it is useful in reinterpreting and reformulating already
consolidated doctrines using new and renovated philosophical instruments.
Moreover, in the VP there are stylistic and linguistic expressions which are
repeated in different contexts, which can be considered single paribhāṣās. The
terminological, methodological and doctrinal innovations of the period bring
with them a new textual elasticity, which reverberates in each context and with
which the VP is fully involved. In order to justify the title, we must investigate its
recurring schemes as phenomena repeated also in corresponding texts.
143 Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (end of the 17th – beginning of the 18th century) was likely a younger con-
temporary of DR. He wrote several important works, among which is the “Mañjūṣā-trilogy”. The
shorter text of this trilogy, which was meant for peculiar beginners, is the Paramalaghumañjūṣā.
Within the grammatical tradition (in addition to Kuṇḍa Bhaṭṭa’s Padārthadīpikā) this text occupies
the same place as the VP within the Advaita tradition and the Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa within the
Mīmāṃsā tradition (Ruegg 1959: 5–6). See also Ganeri (2011: 98–101).
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DR initiates every discussion with a definition, continues with its examina-
tion, moves towards a systematization to arrive at an application of the context
under examination in a broader panorama. It seems likely that this iter helped to
apply definitions correctly. This might be the reason why, in order to create his
vision of paribhāṣā, DR uses definitions as its main structural and stylistic tool.
Therefore, the entire VP is a paribhāṣā in a larger sense. Furthermore, in
addition to definitions (lakṣaṇa) of technical terms, the VP also includes inter-
pretative maxims (nyāya), regulations and restrictions (niyama) and reasoning
(yukti) capable of re-organizing and settling (vyavasthā). Moreover, a complete
demonstration of a concept can be a paribhāṣā, applicable throughout the entire
śāstra. Equally, within the VP, a paribhāṣā can also be seen as a peculiar
revealing marker or conventional indication: through a few words in nomina-
lized style the reader becomes capable of situating a debate within a broader
philosophical panorama.
These formulations can be formalized as causal sentences, recurring nomi-
nalized structures expressed with the grammatical subject in the genitive plus
the ablative (sometimes the instrumental) of an abstract term. This is one of the
characteristics which cause this renovated tool to resemble the style of ancient
philosophical works. However, we must extricate ourselves from simple defini-
tions and argumentative expressions: although some passages match the above-
mentioned characteristics, they are common uses of the śāstric language. In fact,
even though it is true that since most expressions are formulated in the Navya
Nyāya style, it could be considered a meta-linguistic system, nevertheless the
specific settlements and regulations I have referred to have a certain echo that
goes beyond their textual placement. Furthermore, when these structures are
presented within a śāstra as hermeneutic keys, they are often placed after a
discussion studded with doubts, objections and replies. When DR ends the
discussion with a paribhāṣā, he wants that answer to acquire a wider echo
and to solve similar situations throughout the entire śāstra.
It is likely that the sphere in which paribhāṣās are used determines
different translations of the term: meta-rule, general rule, hermeneutic rule,
interpretative maxim, definition, restriction, regulation, settlement or system-
atization, elucidation, beginner-textbook and also convention and indication.
In the textual context treated here, a paribhāṣā appears to be a fluid element,
capable of acquiring several shapes and semantic nuances or suited to being
adjusted to different contents, while remaining remotely faithful to an original
cliché. This vast range of hints transforms itself fluidly according to the
circumstances: when a paribhāṣā is wider and more general it is utilised as a
hermeneutic key for all similar circumstances, and when it is more precise and
focused it is used to regulate and restrict the context in which it is placed.
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One more point should be noted. In the traditional cursus studiorum of the
Kevalādvaitins, the VP is taught as the first text in order to have the student
acquire a significant overview of the entire śāstra. The importance of the VP is
not limited to Advaita. As a matter of fact, other schools of Vedānta – and other
darśanas as well – should study the VP as an anthological compendium gather-
ing together many arguments scattered throughout Advaita literature, such as
those of Prakāśātman and Citsukha, as well as those of Appaya, Nṛsiṃha and
Madhusūdana.
To conclude then, the specific pāribhāṣika model of the VP reinforces my
conviction that, from a certain period on, together with Navya Naiyāyikas, Navya
Vaiyākaraṇas, Navya Alaṃkārikas and Navya Mīmāṃsakas we can reasonably
speak (apart of course from the political nuances of the eighteenth century) of
Navya Vedāntin and even more precisely, of Navya Advaitin.
Acknowledgements: Sincere thanks go to Maria-Piera Candotti, Elisa Freschi,
Alberto Pelissero, and Tiziana Pontillo for their valuable suggestions and correc-
tions, as well as to Judith Trinchero for thoroughly revising my English.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
A=Sharma, R.N. (ed.) (1987–2003): The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. 6 Voll. New Delhi: Munshiram
Manoharlal.
BG= (2000) [I ed. 1859]: Śrīmadbhagavadgītā śāṅkarabhāṣyādyekadaśaṭīkopetā. 3 Voll. Edited
by Shastri Ganjanana Shambhu Sadhale. Delhi: Parimal Publications.
BGBh= see BG.
BSBh=Śaṃkara (2000) [I ed. Delhi 1980]: Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣyaṃ
śrīgovindānandakṛtayā bhāṣyaratnaprabhayā śrīvācaspatimiśraviracitayā bhāmatyā
śrīmadānandagiripraṇītena nyāyanirṇayena samupetam. Edited by Jagadīśa Lāl Śāstrī.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
BSi=Miśra, Maṇḍana (1937): Brahmasiddhi of Ācārya Maṇḍanamiśra with Commentary by
Śaṅkhapāṇi. Edited by M.M. Kuppuswami Sastri. Madras: Madras Government Oriental
Manuscript Series.
GAD=Sarasvatī, Madhusūdana (2005) [I ed. 1962]: Śrīmadbhagavadgītā Madhusūdanī-
saṃskṛta-hindī-vyākhyopetā. Hindīvyākhyākāra Svāmī Śrīsanātanadeva, Ṭippaṇī evaṃ
bhumikā lekhaka. Vārāṇasī: Caukhamba Saṃskṛta Saṃsthāna.
KV= Jayāditya-Vāmana (1985): Kāśikāvṛttiḥ (Haradattamiśrakṛta-padamañjarīvyākhyayā,
jinendrabuddhikṛta-kāśikāvivaraṇapañcikayā nyāsāparābhidhayā copetā). Voll. I–II.
Saṃpādakaḥ Śrīnārāyaṇamiśraḥ. Vārāṇasī: Ratna Publications.
… And What about the Vedānta Paribhāṣā’s paribhāṣātva? 641
LSK=Varadarāja (2001) [I ed. 1940]: Laghusiddhāntakaumudī ‘sudhā’ṭīkopetā. Edited by
Sadāśiva Śāstrī Jośī. Vārāṇasī: Caukhambā Saṃskṛta Series Office.
M= Patañjali (1985–2002) [IV ed., I ed. 1880–1885]: The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. 3
Voll. Edited by F. Kielhorn. Vol. 1. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
MP= Yajvan, Kṛṣṇa (1987) [I ed. 1948]: Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā of Kṛṣṇa Yajvan. Translated and
annotated by Svāmī Mādhavānanda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama.
MP= Yajvan, Kṛṣṇa (1998): Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā of Kṛṣṇa Yajvan. (Sanskrit text with an English
Translation and an elaborate introduction). Edited by Bhabani Prasad Bhattacharya.
Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
MS= Jaimini (1994) [I ed. 1929–1934]: Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte mīmāṃsādarśane
prathamādhyāyasya tarkapādanāmā prathamapādaḥ. Edited by Subbāśāstrī. Pūṇe:
Ānandāśrama.
NK=Udayanācārya (1997): Śrīmadudayanācāryaviracitaḥ nyāyakusumāñjaliḥ
śrīharidāsabhaṭṭācāryaviracitayā vṛttyā prabhā ”khyayā saṃskṛtavyākhyayā vibhā
”khyayā hindīvyakhyayā ca vibhūṣitaḥ. Vyākhyākāraḥ Śrīnārāyaṇamiśraḥ. Dillī-Vārāṇasī:
Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśana.
NK=Udayanācārya (2002) [II ed.]: Śrīmadudayanācāryapraṇītaḥ nyāyakusumāñjaliḥ




sarvatantrasvatantraśrīdharmadatta-(bacchājhā)-praṇītayā ṭippaṇyā ca samullasitaḥ.
Edited by Nyāyācārya Pt. Śrī Padmaprasāda Upādhyāya and Nyāyācārya Pt. Śrī
Dhuṇḍhirāja Śāstrī. Vārāṇasī: Caukhambā Saṃskṛta Series Office.
NSM =Bhaṭṭācārya, Viśvanāthapañcānana (1988) [I ed. Madras 1923]: Kārikāvalī
muktāvalīsahitā sā ca prabhāmañjūṣādinakarīrāmarudrīgaṅgārāmīti
vyākhyāpañcakasamanvitā. Edited by C. Śaṅkararāma Śāstrī. Vārāṇasī. Caukhambā
Saṃskṛta Pratiṣṭhāna.
PP/PPV= Padmapādācārya (1992): Pañcapādikā śrīprakāśātmamunikṛtena
vivaraṇavyākhyānena śrīmadakhaṇḍānandamuniśrīviṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāyakṛtābhyāṃ
tattvadīpanaṛjuvivaraṇa-saṃjñitābhyāṃ vivaraṇavyākhyābhyāṃ ca samalaṃkṛtā. Edited
by S. Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī. Varanasi – Mount Abu: Mahesh Research Institute.
ŚP=Balasubramanian, R. and Raghavan V.K.S.N. [eds.] (1950): The Śaiva Paribhāṣā of Śrī
Śivāgrayogīndrajñānaśivācārya. Edited by H.R. Rangaswamy Iyengar and R. Ramasastri.
Mysore: Oriental Research Institute.
ŚP=Balasubramanian, R. and Raghavan V.K.S.N. [eds.] (1982): Śivāgrayogin, Śaivaparibhāṣā.
Madras: The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of
Madras.
TB=Miśra, Keśava (1979) [II ed., I ed. 1937]: Tarka-Bhāṣā of Keśava Miśra with the Commentary
Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā of Cinnaṃbhaṭṭa. Edited by Devadatta Ramakrishna Bhandarkar and
Pandit Kedarnāth Sāhityabhūṣaṇa. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Insitute.
TrS=Annaṃbhaṭṭa (2007) [II ed.]: Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ nyāyabodhinī-padakṛtya-dīpikā-
kiraṇāvalīvyākhyopetaḥ. Saṃpādakaḥ Śrīkṛṣṇavallabhācārya. Vārāṇasī: Caukhambā
Vidyābhavana.
Upaniṣad= (1996) [I ed. 1970]: Upaniṣatsaṃgrahaḥ. Edited by Jagadīśa Śāstrī. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
642 Gianni Pellegrini
Upaniṣad= (2004) [II ed.]: Śrīśaṅkarabhagavatpādācāryaviracitam upaniṣadbhāṣyam. khaṇḍaḥ
1 (āditaḥ 8 upaniṣadām). samagrabhāṣyasya śrīmadānandagiryācāryakṛtaṭīkayā
kaṭhamāṇḍūkyataittirīya-bhāṣyāṇāṃ prasiddhācāryāntaraṭīkābhiḥ ca samalaṃkṛtam.
Edited with Introduction, notes by Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī. Mount Abu-Varanasi: Mahesh
Research Institute.
VP=Dharmarājādhvarīndra (1984): Vedāntaparibhāṣā savivaraṇa ‘prakāśa’hindīvyakhyopetā.
Vyākhyākāra Gajānana Śāstrī Musalagāvkar. Vārāṇasī: Caukhambha Vidyābhavana.
VP=Dharmarājādhvarīndra (1971) [I ed. 1942]: Vedāntaparibhāṣā. Edited with an English
Translation by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Adyar: The Adyar Library and Research Centre.
VP=Dharmarājādhvarīndra (1997) [I ed. 1942]: Vedāntaparibhāṣā. Translated and Annotated by
Swami Madhavananda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama.
VP=Dharmarājādhvarīndra (2000): Vedāntaparibhāṣā Samaṇiprabhāśikhāmaṇisahitā. Edited
by Pārasanātha Dvivedī and Dadana Upādhyāya. Vārāṇasī: Saṃpūrṇānanda Saṃskṛta
Viśvavidyālaya.
VP/AD=Dharmarājādhvarīndra (1983) [I ed. 1967]: Vedāntaparibhāṣā m.m. śriśivadattakṛtayā
arthadīpikayā sanāthā rāṣṭrabhāṣānuvādena subodhinīvyākhyayā ca saṃvalitā
parīkṣābdhisantaraṇītyākhyapariśiṣṭena copabṛṃhitā. Anuvādako vyākhyākāraś ca
Vedāntasarvadarśanācāryo yatīndrakulatilakaśrīkailāsapīṭhādhīśvara ācārya-
mahāmaṇḍaleśvaraḥ Śrīsvāmīvidyānandagiriḥ. Ṛṣikeśa: Śrī Kailāsa Āśrama Śatābdī
Samāroha Mahāsamiti.
VS=Sadānanda (2004) [I ed. Mysore 1929]: Vedānta-sāra. Edited with an Introduction,
Translation & Explanatory Notes by M. Hiriyanna. Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit
Pratishthan.
YMD=Śrīnivāsadāsa (1949): Yatīndramatadīpikā by Śrīnivāsadāsa. English translation and
notes by Svāmī Ādidevānanda, with a foreword by P.N. Srinivasachari. Mylampore-Madras:
Sri Ramakrishna Math.
Secondary Sources
Ādidevānanda (1949): See YMD
Balasubramanian (1982): See ŚP.
Bhandarkar (1979): See TB.
Bhattacharya (1998): See MP.
Bhattacharya, Dinesh Chandra (1941): “Who wrote the Bhāṣāpariccheda?” Indian Historical
Quarterly 17: 241–244.
Bilimoria, Purusottama (1980a): “Āsatti and Yogyatā in Sentential-Comprehension: Vedānta
Paribhāṣā”. Journal of Indian Philosophy 8.4: 393–399.
Bilimoria, Purusottama (1980b): “Perception (pratyakṣa) in Advaita Vedānta”. Philosophy East
and West 30.1: 35–44.
Bilimoria, Purusottama (2008) [I ed. Dordrecht 1988]: Śabdapramāṇa: Word and Knowledge in
Indian Philosophy. (Studies of Classical India 10). New Delhi: DK Printworld.
Bronkhorst, Johannes – Diaconescu, Bogdan – Kulkarni, Malhar (2013): “The Arrival of Navya-
Nyāya Techniques in Varanasi”. In: An Indian Editing. Rediscovering the Grandeur of Indian
Heritage for a Sustainable Future. Essays in Honour of Professor Dr. John Vattanky SJ on
… And What about the Vedānta Paribhāṣā’s paribhāṣātva? 643
Completing Eighty Years. Edited by Kuruvilla Pandikattu SJ and Binoy Pichalakkattu SJ.
Delhi: Serial Publications, 73–109.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993): “Review of Bilimoria’s Śabdapramāṇa”. Journal of Indian
Philosophy 21.1: 103–105.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1998): “Does the Vedas Have an Author? A Reply to Professor Stephen
H. Phillips”. Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 52.1: 5–14.
Brunner, Fernand (1987): “L’inférence selon la Vedāntaparibhāṣa”. Asiatische Studien 51.2: 67–78.
Chakravarti, Prabhat Chandra (1940): Doctrine of śakti in Indian Literature. Delhi: Eastern Book
Linkers.
Chakrabarti, Samiran Chandra (1980): The Paribhāṣās in the Śrautasūtras. Calcutta: Sanskrit
Pustak Bhandar.
Dasgupta (1997): See VP.
Dasgupta, Surendranath (1991) [I ed. Cambridge 1922]: A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. II.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Datta, D. M. (1997) [I ed. 1932]: The Six Ways of Knowing. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.
Devasthali, G.V. (1985 Originally Published in Indian Antiquary (III.1–4) 1969 “Paribhāṣā
(Introduction and General Survey)”. In: Glimpses of Veda and Vyākaraṇa. Reflections on
Some Less Familiar Topics. Edited by G. V. Devasthali. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1–13.
Ganeri, Jonardon (2011): The Lost Age of Reason. Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450–1700.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Gupta, Bina (1995) [I ed. London-Toronto 1991]: Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta: Epistemological
Analysis and Interpretation. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Ingalls, H.H. Daniel (1988) [I ed. Cambridge-Mass. 1951]: Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya
Logic. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Jhalakīkar, Bhīmācārya (1978) [I ed. 1893]: Nyāyakośaḥ. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute.
Kajiyama, Yuichi (1998): An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An annotated translation of
the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und
Buddhismuskunde. Heft 42. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistiche Studien
Universität Wien.
Kunjunni-Raja, K. (ed.) (1974): New Catalogus Catalogorum. Vol. VIII. Madras: University of
Madras.
Mādhavānanda (1987): See MP.
Mādhavānanda (1997): See VP.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna (1977): Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In: A History of Indian Literature. Edited by Jan
Gonda. Volume VI. Fasc. 2. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna (1968): The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation. The Semantics and
Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-nyāya Philosophy. Cambridge-Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Mayeda, Sengaku (1968–1969): “The Advaita Theory of Perception”. Wiener Zeitschrift für die
Kunde Sud und Östasiens. XII–XIII: 221–240.
Minkowski, Christopher (2011): “Advaita in Early Modern History”. Southern Asian History and
Culture 2.2: 205–231.
Miśra (1997): See NK.
Patil, Parimal (2013): “The Historical Rhythms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Knowledge System”. In:
Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy. Edited by Eli Franco. Wien:
Sammlung de Nobili, 91–125.
644 Gianni Pellegrini
Pellegrini, Gianni (2009): “Svapna: alcune considerazioni sull’epistemologia del sogno”. In:
Sogni e visioni nel mondo indo-mediterraneo. Quaderni di studi indo-mediterranei. A cura
di Daniela Boccassini. Vol. II. Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 71–89.
Pellegrini, Gianni (2011): “Analysis of the Second and Fourth Definition of Mithyātva in the
Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī”. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39.4–5: 441–459.
Pellegrini, Gianni (2015): “Old is Gold! Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Way of Referring to Earlier
Textual Tradition”. Journal of Indian Philosophy 43.2–3: 277–334.
Pellegrini, Gianni (2016a): “On the Alleged Indebtedness of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā Towards the
Vedānta Kaumudī: Some Considerations on an Almost Forgotten Vivaraṇa Text (Studies in
Vedānta Kaumudī I)”. Journal of Indian Philosophy 44.3: 485–505.
Pellegrini, Gianni (2016b): “Differentiating jāti from upādhi: Towards a further exegesis of the
six jātibādhakas according to Navya Nyāya”. In: Proceedings of the Meeting of the Italian
Association of Sanskrit Studies (Bologna 27–28 March 2015). Edited by Raffaele Torella,
Marco Franceschini, Tiziana Pontillo, Cinzia Pieruccini, Antonio Rigopoulos, Francesco
Sferra. Rivista degli Studi Orientali, Supplemento n. 2. Nuova Serie 89: 73–92.
Phillips, Stephen H. (1995): “Book Review Response”. Philosophy East & West 45.2: 273–279.
Potter, Karl H. (1988): “Vedāntaparibhāṣā as Systematic Reconstruction”. In: Perspectives on
Vedānta. Edited by S. S. Rama Rao Pappu. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 92–113.
Ruegg, Sayfort David (1959): Contributions a l’histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne.
Publicationsde l’Institut deCivilisation Indienne.Collège de France. Paris: DiffusiondeBoccard.
Sarasvatī, Saccidānandendra (1969): Viśuddhavedāntaparibhāṣā. Holenarsipur: Adhyātma
Prakāśakaryālaya.
Śarma, Ṭhakuradatta (1989) [II ed.]: Bhuvaneśalaukikanyāyasāhasrī. Varanasi: Vyasa Prakashan.
Sastri-Sastri (1959): See Sastri, Anantakrishna N.S and Sastri Ramamurthi K.
Sastri, Anantakrishna N.S / Sastri, Ramamurthi K. (1959): Bibliography of Advaita Vedānta.
Appendix I in: Nyāyacandrikā by Ānandapūrṇamunīndra with the commentary
Nyāyaprakāśikā of Svarūpānandamunīndra”. Madras: Government Oriental Manuscript
Library, 1–121.
Śāstrī, Gajānana Musalagāvkar (1992): Mīmāṃsā darśan kā vivecanātmak itihās. Vārāṇasī:
Caukhambā Vidyābhavana.
Sastri (1971): See VP.
Satprakashananda, Swami (2001) [I ed. London 1965]: Methods of Knowledge according to
Advaita Vedanta. Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama.
Sharma, B.N.K. (1981) [I ed. Bombay 1961]: History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its
Literature. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Sitamahalakshmi, B. (2003) [I ed. 1968]: “Venkatanatha”. In: Perceptors of Advaita. General
Editor T.M.P. Mahadevan. Madras: Samata Books, 276–280.
Soni, Jayendra (1989): Philosophical Anthropology in Śaivasiddhānta. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
Staal, Frits (1961): “Theory of Definition in Indian Logic”. Journal of the American Oriental
Society 81.2: 122–126.
Staal, Frits (1975): “The Concept of Metalanguage and Its Indian Background”. Journal of Indian
Philosophy 3.3–4: 315–356.
Staal, Frits (1995): “The Sanskrit of Science”. Journal of Indian Philosophy 23.1: 73–127.
Upādhyāya-Śāstrī. (2002): See NK.
Wujastyk, Dominik (ed.) (1993): Metarules of Pāṇinian Grammar. Vyāḍi’s Paribhāṣāvṛtti. 2 Voll.
Vol. V. Groningen Oriental Studies. Groningen: Egbert Forsten.
… And What about the Vedānta Paribhāṣā’s paribhāṣātva? 645
